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WAIVER OF CLAIMS BY INADVERTENT PROCEDURAL
DEFAULTS: COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON CRIMINAL
JUDGMENTS IN INDIANA
DAVID E. VANDERCOY*
Surely no fair-minded persons will contend that those who
have been deprived of their liberty without due process
ought nevertheless to languish in prison.1
All litigation must come to an end at some time.'
These statements reveal the tension inherent in the law regard-
ing collateral attacks on criminal judgments. On one hand, our society
considers liberty to be of transcending value.3 The wrongful4 depriva-
tion of liberty merits curative action and the process used to deprive
one of liberty includes corrective process after "final" judgment.' On
* Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A.
1971, Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1974, Dickinson School of Law; LL.M. 1980,
New York University. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and sugges-
tions of colleagues Paul N. Cox, Bruce G. Berner and David A. Myers.
1. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
2. Etheridge v. State, 240 Ind. 384, 386, 164 N.E.2d 642, 644 (1960).
3. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The accused in criminal prosecu-
tions traditionally has enjoyed more protection than is afforded civil litigants. Examples
include the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right against self
incrimination, the right to a speedy trial and the right to counsel. These reflect a
judgment not only on the value of liberty, but also a concern over the state's awesome
power to deprive one of liberty.
4. "Wrongful" does not necessarily imply that the original judgment of con-
viction was factually incorrect. Factual guilt or innocence can never be absolutely deter-
mined. Events are not subject to exact re-creation and, even if they were, that which
constitutes a "fact" is a function of subjective perception. See generally Frank, Words
and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1272-74
(1947); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 446-48 (1963). Thus, when a court reviews a criminal conviction
all that can be determined is whether there has been compliance with the rules designed
to promote a fair determination. If a deviation has occurred, a legal standard can then
be applied to determine whether the fairness of the underlying proceedings has been
sufficiently compromised to require that relief be provided. See infra text accompanying
notes 186-195.
5. All states provide for appellate review of criminal convictions. In addi-
tion, all states have some type of post-conviction remedy. See L. YACKLE, POST
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the other hand, the state and society have an interest in attaching
finality to criminal judgments. The specter of endless attacks on a
criminal judgment generates distaste because of the potential for
manipulation and abuse' and because such a process may undercut
legitimate state interests. Some authors argue that the availability
of such process thwarts rehabilitation because a prisoner is never re-
quired to accept the justness of his conviction nor the corollary that
a wrong has been done.' Others contend that the lack of finality de-
means the significance of the original trial where the alleged offender
must face his accusers and is called to account Many contend that
the availability of collateral relief after final judgment encourages
"sandbagging" or the intentional withholding of claims to gain a tactical
advantage.' Federal and state relations are impaired and the integr-
ity of the entire state process undermined by the availability and broad
CONVICTION REMEDIES §13 (1981 and Supp 1983). The scope of the review provided by the
latter varies from one jurisdiction to another. The common law writs of habeas corpus
and coram nobis as well as statutory federal habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. SS 2254, 2255
(1976), are also examples of mechanisms designed to provide collateral review. The
existence of curative process mechanisms intended to operate out of normal procedural
channels supports the contention that contemporary values require the provision of
corrective process after final judgment in criminal cases.
Arguably, the provision of post-conviction remedies by the states results not
from a desire to cure wrongful incarceration but rather from a desire to minimize
federal interference which occurs when federal courts review state court judgments
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. See infra text accompanying notes 27-29. However, the
existence of the common law writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis which predated
modern state post-conviction remedies suggest otherwise, although these writs were
of very limited scope. See L. YACKLE, supra note 5, at SS 2, 3, 7, and 8. It may be ac-
curate to suggest that the expansion of state post-conviction remedies, as opposed
to the existence of the same, partially resulted from a desire to minimize federal in-
terference with state court judgments by providing the state court system with the
initial opportunity to rule on federal issues.
6. The potential for abuse includes repetitious filings, frivolous filings and
the intentional withholding of claims to gain a tactical advantage. See infra text accom-
paying notes 215-217. See generally STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S 22-6.1, com-
mentary at 22-69 (2d ed. 1982) (questioning the extent of actual abuse) [hereinafter
cited as ABA STANDARDS].
7. Bator, supra note 4, at 452; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 149, (1970); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 127 (1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 218-224.
8. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977).
9. Id. "We think the rule of Fay v. Noia, broadly stated, may encourage
'sandbagging' on the part of defense lawyers, who may take their chances on a ver-
dict of not guilty in a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional
claims in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off." Id. See infra
notes 215-217 and accompanying text.
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usage of federal habeas review of state court convictions.10
Post-conviction review is thus perceived as necessary and
desirable to cure instances of wrongful incarceration and undesirable
to the extent that the resulting lack of finality undermines the in-
tegrity of the original proceedings and the purposes of incarceration.
The appropriate scope of post-conviction review is determined by
balancing the objectives of finality and those of curative process. State
post-conviction rules generally reflect the perception that the scope
of such review does not include the opportunity to relitigate claims
of error." Rather, state post-conviction remedies are thought to exist
to address claims of error not previously tried."2 In many, if not most,
instances the claims could have been raised in the original proceedings.
Because this is true, state rules regarding the effect of failing to raise
a claim through normal procedural channels are of critical importance.
Specifically, the rules or principles utilized to determine whether there
has been a waiver" of the right to assert a claim by reason of an
10. The reference is to the power of a federal court to review the legality
of a state prisoner's confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-265 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). The principal pur-
pose of the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. S 2254 is "to protect the state courts'
role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial pro-
ceedings." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). The exhaustion requirement also
"serves to minimize friction between our federal and state systems of justice by allowing
the state an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners'
federal rights." Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 2 (1981) (per curiam).
11. See L. YACKLE, supra note 4, at SS 6 and 11 for a discussion of illustrative
examples of state post-conviction procedures and SS 1-13 for a general discussion of
such procedures. Most states appear to reach the conclusion that no purpose is served
by relitigating a claim that has been fully addressed. Absent a change in the law ap-
plicable to such a claim, the conclusion appears to be eminently sound. See Bator, supra
note 4, at 447. "Assuming that there 'exists', in a ultimate sense, a 'correct decision'
of a question of law, we can never be assured that any particular tribunal has in the
past made it: we can always continue to ask whether the right rule was applied, whether
a new rule should not have been fashioned." Id. Once an issue has been fully aired,
relitigation would not and could not ensure that a more "correct" result would be
secured. Note that different considerations control relitigation of claims on federal
habeas corpus review of state court judgments concerning federal issues. See generally
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), for a discussion of those considerations.
12. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at S 22-6.1, commentary at 22-63.
13. "Waiver" as a legal term has several definitions. The doctrine of res judicata
is often referred to as one type of waiver relating directly to finality of judgments,
i.e., a final judgment is conclusive not only as to those matters actually litigated, but
also as to those matters which could have been litigated. Review of claims not timely
raised is foreclosed regardless of whether the omission was deliberate or inadvertent.
This form of "waiver" seems to be a procedural rule which operates to the exclusion
of all other considerations to provide for finality. "Waiver" in the classic sense is the
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antecedent procedural default will commonly determine the actual
scope of post-conviction review. The waiver doctrine employed in any
given jurisdiction becomes the primary vehicle for accomodation be-
tween the competing demands of making effective curative process
available and yet attaching some measure of finality to criminal
judgments.
This article is not about federal habeas corpus review of state
court convictions. It is about state post-conviction proceedings, the
role served by such proceedings as devices of curative process and
the impairment to finality interests which results from such process.
Indiana law is used as the vehicle for analysis although the premises
are applicable elsewhere.
The central question addressed is whether the scope of review
in such proceedings should include claims which were the subject of
an inadvertent procedural default. To accomplish this task, the arti-
cle examines the waiver of claims doctrine in the context of collateral
attacks brought pursuant to the Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post-
Conviction Remedies, Rule P.C. 1.1 First, the language and purpose
of the Indiana post-conviction rule is examined. The rule appears to
make meaningful corrective process available by providing that claims
which have not been the subject of a knowing, voluntary and in-
telligent waiver may be asserted. 5 This aspect of the rule has been
concept that the individual possesses the right and he or she may choose to assert
the same or forego its timely assertion. By consciously foregoing that assertion, the
right is surrendered. See generally Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 478 (1981) (distinguishing various theories of waiver and discussing state
preclusion); Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis,
55 TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at S 22-6.1, commentary at 22-65.
14. Indiana has established two distinct post-conviction procedures. See
INDIANA RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES [hereinafter cited as P.C.].
P.C. 1 contemplates true collateral review, i.e., review out of normal procedural channels.
On its face, this rule permits the assertion of claims not previously litigated and which
have not been the subject of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. See P.C.
1 S 8 (quoted in text accompanying note 31). See also text accompanying notes 34-40.
The rule provides that the P.C. 1 remedy is not a substitute for direct appeal and
requires a defendant to take all available steps to perfect such an appeal including
those available under P.C. 2. See P.C. 1 S 1(b). P.C. 1 takes the place of all common
law, statutory or other remedies which were available prior to the adoption of P.C.
1 for purposes of challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence. Id.
P.C. 2 provides the opportunity to seek restoration of the right to post-trial
review by the trial court and to review by direct appeal. See infra note 17 and accom-
panying text. If restoration occurs, the proceedings are treated as though timely in
all respects. P.C. 2 S 1(c). Therefore, the same "waiver" doctrine as is normally ap-
plicable to such proceedings should apply, i.e., the contemporaneous objection rule.
15. P.C. 1 S 8.
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eviscerated by case law holdings which effectively bar review of claims
not timely raised regardless of whether the antecedent default was
inadvertent or deliberate. These holdings are the second subject of
scrutiny. Next, this article analyzes the nature of curative process
and the cost of making such process available after final judgment
for purposes of addressing claims not timely raised due to in-
advertence. Such costs are measured in terms of their impairment
to the interests served by attaching finality to judgments. The thesis
asserted is that claims not timely raised due to inadvertence, usually
counsel's inadvertence, should be reviewable in post-conviction pro-
ceedings. The conclusion reached is that the state's interest in finali-
ty can be served by alternatives less drastic than foreclosure of review
by reason of inadvertence.
I. PURPOSES UNDERLYING THE INDIANA RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR POST CONVICTION HEARINGS.
In 1969 the Indiana Supreme Court adopted rules of procedure
to govern post-conviction proceedings. The rules provide for two
separate procedures.' 6 P.C. 1 provides the means of asserting claims
not previously raised at trial or on direct appeal and therefore con-
templates the occurrence of an antecedent procedural default." P.C.
16. See supra note 14.
17. P.C. 1 S 1 provides the following grounds upon which relief may be sought:
SECTION 1. Remedy-To whom available-Conditions.
(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime
by a court of this state, and who claims:
(1) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Con-
stitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state;
(2) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise erroneous;
(4) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence
in the interest of justice;
(5) that his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or condi-
tional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in
custody or other restraint;
(6) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral
attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any
common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or
remedy;
may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief.
The rule makes clear that issues previously litigated may not be relitigated. P.C. 1
S 8. Given the broad statement of available grounds, and that previously litigated
issues may not be relitigated, the rule necessarily contemplates litigation of claims
not previously raised in normal procedural channels. See infra text accompanying note
40.
19841
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2 envisions restoring the applicant's right to post-trial review by the
trial court or restoration of appellate rights in cases in which the
defendant did not avail himself of the opportunity for such review
within the appropriate time limits.18
The rules appear to have been intended to serve two distinct
purposes. In the words of the Indiana Supreme Court, the rules were
first intended to promote "justice and fair play" by providing an
avenue by which one convicted of a crime could test the correctness
of his conviction on appeal. 9 The court has not precisely articulated
why notions of fair play require the availability of post-conviction
relief. It is nevertheless possible to derive such a rationale from no-
tions of justice and fair play prevailing in the American criminal justice
system viewed generally. The purpose of according "rights"2 is to
insure that both the results reached and the process by which those
results are obtained are consistent with fundamental notions of fairness
as they are defined by society's shared value system and as they are
identified in the historical experience of that system."' The failure to
accord a right necessarily impugns the integrity of the result.' Justice
and fairness are promoted by providing a corrective process in which
such issues may be raised and fully litigated.' Because some issues
may not be known to the defendant24 or may be unavailable at the
18. P.C. 2 permits such restoration on a showing that the failure to perfect
the right to review was not the fault of the defendant and that the defendant has
been diligent in requesting permission to perfect his right to such review. See supra
note 14.
19. Langley v. State, 256 Ind. 199, 203, 267 N.E.2d 538, 540 (1971). "In the
name of justice and fair play this court, through its promulgation of our post convic-
tion remedy rules and by case decision, has sought to ensure that each defendant
will have an avenue available by which he may challenge on appeal the correctness
of his conviction." Id.
20. The term "rights" as used herein connotes both rights in the classical
sense, powers one is entitled to assert, and the notion that restraints or limits are
placed on governmental conduct.
21. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12, 107-18 (1951). See also Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 565 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring) "[Tihe criminal trial has one well-
defined purpose-to provide a fair and reliable determination of guilt." Id.
22. The point here is simply that a deviation from the rules designed to pro-
mote a fair and reliable determination of guilt calls into question whether the result
is indeed fair and reliable. See infra notes 186-194 and accompanying text. This does
not suggest that every deviation requires reversal and that a new determination of
guilt or innocence must be made. See Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
23. Although it is clear that the perception of justness and fairness to the
accused is promoted by providing corrective process in which the merits of issues
may be litigated outside normal channels, a cost in the form of diminished finality
also results. See infra text accompanying notes 200-232.
24. One basic perception is that a criminal defendant cannot be assured of
a fair trial without counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This is true
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time of trial or direct appeal, direct appeal in and of itself is not suf-
ficient corrective process to prevent wrongful incarceration.25 Thus,
the Indiana Supreme Court's statement that the post-conviction rules
were intended to promote justice and fairness is properly predicated
on the assumption that the fair resolution of criminal cases requires
that all issues involved be fully litigated even if such review must
occur out of the normal procedural channels."
The second purpose of the rules was to preserve the integrity
of state court proceedings by providing Indiana courts with the op-
portunity to rule on federal constitutional issues before such issues
were presented to a federal court via habeas corpus review.27 At the
time the rules were adopted federal law appeared to be well settled
that 1) the failure of a habeas petitioner to present his claims to the
state courts would bar federal habeas review only if the petitioner
had "deliberately bypassed" the state court system, and 2) the habeas
exhaustion requirement required exhaustion of state remedies
available at the time the habeas petitioner sought federal relief. Thus,
if no available state remedy providing for collateral attack existed,
the exhaustion requirement would be deemed satisfied and the failure
to have presented such claims in the state court would not bar federal
habeas review, absent a deliberate bypass, even if those issues were
deemed waived by state procedural rules.' The only means of assur-
since "[elven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law . . . . He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel he may be . . . convicted upon incompetent evidence .... He lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he may
have a perfect one." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 69 (1932). Thus, our assump-
tion must be that most of the issues or claims which an accused could assert will
be unknown to him. Obviously, counsel's knowledge of a claim can be imputed to the
client-accused. However, whether counsel's failure to protect the claims should bind
the client is a separate question. See infra text accompanying notes 70-110. See generally
Note, A New Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases: The Asser-
tion of Rights Standard, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 41 (1983).
25. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also Kissinger v. State, 161
Ind. App. 303, 305, 315 N.E.2d 423, 425 (1974). "The promulgation of the post-conviction
remedy rules evidenced the belief that justice and fundamental fairness requires the
maintenance of open channels to the courts whereby defendants may challenge the
validity of their convictions." Id.
26. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
27. Langley, 256 Ind. at 204-205, 267 N.E.2d at 541 (1971).
28. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
29. Id. The rule of Fay was sharply limited in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977). In Wainwright, the Court ruled that when a defendant fails to comply with
state procedural rules requiring the timely assertion of claims with the result that
the state courts decline to consider those claims, the procedural default would con-
stitute an independent and adequate state procedural ground. Review pursuant to 28
1984]
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ing state review of such issues was to create a procedure to be ex-
hausted in which a state prisoner could assert those claims not
previously heard.
To serve these purposes P.C. 1 provides, inter alia, that a per-
son whose conviction was in violation of the Constitution of the United
States or the constitution or laws of the State of Indiana could in-
stitute a P.C. 1 proceeding at any time to secure relief." The waiver
rule applicable to individuals seeking relief pursuant to this rule
provides:
SECTION 8. Waiver of or failure to assert claims. All
grounds for relief available to a petitioner under this rule
must be raised in his original petition. Any ground finally
adjudicated on the merits or not so raised and knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that
resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other pro-
ceeding the petitioner has taken to secure relief, may not
be the basis for a subsequent petition, unless the court finds
a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was
not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original
petition."
The plain meaning of the waiver provision is that a claim not raised
in the original proceeding or other prior proceeding is waived only
if the conduct of the petitioner amounts to a knowing, voluntary and
intelligent waiver. Even if such a waiver is found, the court may ex-
cuse it on a finding of sufficient reason for the prior failure to assert
the claim.3" The knowing and intelligent standard is obviously distinct
from the procedural default rule normally applicable on direct appeal.
The latter provides that the failure to present a claim to the trial
court precludes consideration of the claim on appeal regardless of
whether the default was inadvertent or knowing and intelligent.'
U.S.C. S 2254 would be barred absent a showing of cause for the procedural default
and prejudice resulting therefrom. The Fay deliberate bypass standard was rejected
with regard to trial defaults.
30. P.C. 1 S l(a). See supra note 16 for a listing of grounds available to P.C.
1 petitioners.
31. P.C. 1 S 8.
32. Id.
33. The procedural default rule applicable on direct appeal in Indiana is the
normal contemporaneous objection rule. That rule provides "[elrrors, to be appealable,
must be objected to at trial, thus enabling the trial judge to promptly correct or avoid
error as the proceedings progress." Langley, 256 Ind. at 206, 267 N.E.2d at 542. Since
the major purpose of the rule is to provide an opportunity to the trial court to avoid
or timely correct error, it matters not whether the litigant's failure to provide that
[Vol. 18
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II. THE INITIAL JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE
WAIVER PROVISION.
A case decided shortly after adoption of post-conviction rules sug-
gested the obvious. The procedural default rule applicable to direct
appeals would not be applicable to post-conviction procedures." ' In
McKinley v. State,35 a direct appeal was taken by the defendant after
he was found guilty of commission of a robbery while armed. In that
appeal McKinley argued, for the first time, that the state failed to
prove that he used "violence" in the commission of the act as required
by the statute. 8 Relying upon the rule requiring a party to present
the claimed error to the trial court in order to preserve the issue
for appeal, the court held that McKinley was not entitled to litigate
the claim on direct appeal. 7 The court in dicta added that the provi-
sions of P.C. 1 afforded McKinley an avenue to present the error to
the trial court and to secure appellate review of adverse rulings made
by the trial court.'
While the McKinley court did not attempt to define the exact
nature of the waiver doctrine to be applied in post-conviction pro-
ceedings, the opinion does suggest that the procedural default rules
applicable to direct appeal would not apply to collateral attacks
brought pursuant to P.C. 1. Given the explicit language of P.C. 1 S
8 requiring a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver, such a con-
clusion seems inescapable. Furthermore, the rule makes it clear that
claims finally adjudicated on the merits are not reviewable in Indiana
post-conviction proceedings.39 If issues previously raised and finally
determined are not subject to religitation, and if issues not raised
in a timely fashion are unavailable, P.C. 1 proceedings would be
restricted to claims which could not have been presented at trial,
essentially claims of newly discovered evidence."
opportunity is intentional or the product of neglect. Additionally, IND. R. App. P.
8.3(A)(7) generally provides that errors presented on appeal must have been presented
to the lower court. The requirements of the contemporaneous objection rule and those
of IND. R. App. P. 8.3(A)(7) yield in cases of fundamental error. Moore v. State, __ Ind.
. - . 440 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (1982). The fundamental error doctrine is discussed
in the text accompanying notes 233-258.
34. McKinley v. State, 253 Ind. 187, 252 N.E.2d 420 (1969).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 191, 252 N.E.2d at 422.
37. Id. at 194, 252 N.E.2d at 423-424.
38. Id. at 193, 252 N.E.2d at 423.
39. P.C. 1 S 8.
40. The broad statement of available grounds identified in P.C. 1 S 1, supra
note 16, when read in conjunction with the waiver rule, P.C. 1 S 8, supr text accom-
panying note 31, suggests that such a construction would be untenable.
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Nevertheless, dicta found in Langley v. State" raised questions
regarding both the viability of P.C. 1 as an avenue of relief and the
nature of the post-conviction waiver rule. In Langley two post-
conviction cases involving Langley and one Richardson were con-
solidated for review.' Richardson had been found guilty of the crime
of robbery by putting in fear."3 After conviction, Richardson sought
neither post-trial review by the trial court nor appellate review." One
year after conviction Richardson sought post-conviction review by fil-
ing a petition pursuant to P.C. 1. Langley had sought timely appellate
review by direct appeal in which his conviction was affirmed."5 Langley
then sought P.C. 1 relief which was denied by the trial court."
At the trial level, the State responded on the merits to the issues
raised by Richardson's and Langley's petitions and did not argue
waiver." The Indiana Supreme Court reached the merits of both peti-
tioners' claims and also discussed the waiver issues which were pre-
sent but had not been raised by the State in the trial court." The
court's discussion of the waiver doctrine was not dispositive but rather
was intended to provide an overview of the role to be played by post-
conviction proceedings vis-a-vis normal appellate review. 9 In so do-
ing, the court asserted several rather interesting propositions.
Regarding Richardson's failure to take a direct appeal, the court
indicated its belief that such an omission might constitute a waiver
of the right to seek post-conviction relief subsequently." Second, the
court indicated that the usual procedural default rule applicable on
direct appeal, that errors must be objected to at trial in order to be
reviewable, would be applied to P.C. 1 proceedings." One justifica-
tion offered to support this conclusion was that such a rule affords
the trial judge the opportunity to rule on the claim and avoid the
commission of error."2 A second justification was also offered:
[S]uch a requirement bars a litigant from asserting error
on appeal, objection to which he chose to forego for strategic
reasons at trial. Thus, where a defendant is effectively
41. 256 Ind. 199, 267 N.E.2d 538 (1971).
42. Id. at 201, 267 N.E.2d at 539.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 202, 267 N.E.2d at 540.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 207, 267 N.E.2d at 543.
48. Id. at 206-207, 267 N.E.2d at 542.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 205, 267 N.E.2d at 541.
51. Id. at 206, 267 N.E.2d at 542.
52. Id.
[Vol. 18
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represented by trial counsel and objections to trial pro-
cedure, admission of evidence, etc. are foregone, a binding
waiver of the right to object may be asserted against the
defendant.
Stated otherwise, counsel's failure to object would be deemed a know-
ing, intelligent and voluntary waiver which would be imputed to the
defendant.
Finally, in response to Richardson's case, the court stated its
belief that when the waiver issue has been raised by the State, the
petitioner must show some "substantial basis or circumstance" which
would satisfactorily mitigate a petitioner's failure to have pursued or
perfected a remedy through the normal procedural routes." Thus, the
usual rule that failure to object at trial precludes review on direct
appeal would be applied to post-conviction proceedings subject to the
modification that a petitioner could attempt to show mitigating cir-
cumstances to justify or explain the procedural default.
Langley, unlike Richardson, had previously sought review by
direct appeal.55 One of the issues raised in his direct appeal was the
propriety of the trial court denying Langley the right to file a belated
motion for a new trial." Langley had sought to file such a motion
to assert claims regarding the effectiveness of trial counsel and the
admission of certain evidence in addition to those issues raised in his
timely filed motion for a new trial." On direct appeal, the Indiana
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of permission to file
a belated motion for a new trial on the ground that Langley failed
to show the requisite due diligence." Thus, the court ruled that the
claim regarding the effectiveness of trial counsel was not properly
before the court on the direct appeal. 9 In Langley's post-conviction
case, the court addressed the question of the extent to which a peti-
tioner will be permitted to argue an issue raised by his P.C. 1 peti-
tion when review of the same issue had been denied on direct appeal.
The court's response was as follows:
[.. .T]he answer to this question depends to a large extent
upon the nature of the issue presented, the manner in which
53. Id., (citirg Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965)).
54. Langley, 256 Ind. at 207, 267 N.E.2d at 545.
55. Id. at 202, 267 N.E.2d at 540.
56. Id. at 210, 267 N.E.2d at 544.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 211, 267 N.E.2d at 545. See also Langley v. State, 250 Ind. 29, 232
N.E.2d 611, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968).
59. 256 Ind. 199, 212, 267 N.E.2d 538, 545 (1971).
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appellate review was sought and the reasons advanced for
a denial of review on the merits. To unreservedly hold the
door open for appellate review under the post-conviction
remedy rules, regardless of the circumstances which pre-
ceded, would per force characterize post-conviction relief as
some sort of "super-appeal" contrary to its intended
function."0
The various propositions advanced by the court in Langley ap-
pear to stem from the court's dissatisfaction with the proposition that
an issue which could not be reviewed on direct appeal for want of
a timely trial objection would be subject to review in a P.C. 1 pro-
ceeding. Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, the prior procedural
default would be a bar to review on direct appeal but not in post-
conviction proceedings. The court expressly rejected the notion that
P.C. 1 was intended to serve as a "super-appeal" process"' and ob-
served that the "multi-appeals" thought to be afforded by the rule
would be a "prostitution of the spirit of criminal justice." 2 The court
made clear that the preferred method of obtaining review of a criminal
judgment is through direct appeal of a trial court's denial of a motion
to correct errors. Such a procedure permits the trial court to rule
on issues while they are fresh. Moreover, the court perceived the scope
of direct appeal to be broader than that available on collateral at-
tack, thus permitting a fuller airing of the issues. 3 Given the court's
perception that the post-conviction rules should not be viewed as a
super-appeal process and that the scope of review on direct appeal
is and should be broader than that available in post-conviction pro-
ceedings, it is not surprising that the propositions advanced all serve
to undermine the knowing and intelligent waiver standard set forth
in P.C. 1 § 8.
There is little doubt that the propositions advanced by way of
dicta in Langley are in conflict with the express provisions of P.C.
1. The notion that a waiver of the right to appeal might effectively
waive the right to litigate specific issues in a P.C. 1 proceeding is
inconsistent with the waiver provision of the rule. Again, the waiver
provision envisions the forfeiture of claims only if those claims were
the subject of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver."' A find-
ing that an accused waived the right to direct appeal says nothing
60. Id. at 210, 267 N.E.2d at 544.
61. Id. at 211, 267 N.E.2d at 545.
62. Id. at 203, 267 N.E.2d at 540.
63. Id.
64. P.C. 1 S 8, supra text accompanying note 31.
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about whether a specific issue or ground which could have been rais-
ed on direct appeal was knowingly waived." Fortunately, the premise
that waiver of the right to a direct appeal might waive the right to
seek review in post-conviction proceedings has not been adopted by
Indiana courts although the proposition has been repeatedly offered
in dicta.16
Unfortunately, the Langley court's suggestion that the waiver
rule applicable to direct appeals, the contemporaneous objection rule,
is applicable as a bar in P.C. 1 proceedings has been adopted and
liberally applied by Indiana courts in subsequent cases.6 7 A knowing
and intelligent waiver is not required. Whether the product of con-
scious decision-making or of inadvertence, the petitioner's failure to
make a timely objection or to assert his claims at trial or on direct
appeal results in a forfeiture of those claims unless the defendant
demonstrates "sufficient" reason for the non-assertion.68 This premise
undercuts the letter and spirit of P.C. 1. Moreover, cases decided after
Langley suggest that the Indiana Supreme Court has imposed a very
rigorous standard which a petitioner must meet to justify the failure
to assert claims on a timely basis. The court effectively requires a
demonstration of ineffective assistance of counsel under the farce and
mockery standard as one of the few if not the only "sufficient" reason
to justify the prior procedural default. 9
65. It seems logical to suggest that a defendant could predicate an appeal
only on those claims of which he is aware. To suggest that a defendant should appeal
solely for purposes of preserving his opportunity to assert claims of which he might
subsequently become aware is a most blatant invitation to frivolous appeals.
66. See, e.g., Gross v. State, 162 Ind. App. 649, 652, 320 N.E.2d 817, 820 (1975).
"[T]he rules were not intended to create an avenue for untimely challenge of proceedings
after a legitimate waiver of the right to appeal." Id.
67. Holt v. State, __ Ind. - 408 N.E.2d 538 (1980) (failure to object at
trial waives claim of prosecutorial misconduct for purposes of direct appeal and post-
conviction relief); Bryant v. State, 77 Ind. 187, 406 N.E.2d 1177 (1980) (failure to object
at trial renders issue unavailable for direct appeal and for post-conviction remedies);
Harrison v. State, 166 Ind. App. 602, 337 N.E.2d 533 (1975) (failure to object to admis-
sion of evidence at trial precludes assertion of the claim on direct appeal or in post-
conviction proceedings). See also cases cited infra note 73.
68. Id. See cases cited infra note 73.
69. See infra notes 154-172 and accompanying text. The appellate courts have
suggested only two "reasons" other than ineffective assistance which would constitute
justification for a default. In Davis v. State, 164 Ind. App. 331, 328 N.E.2d 768 (1975)
the court of appeals responded to a post-conviction petitioner's claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective. The usual rule applied by Indiana courts is that "[tihe failure
to raise the issue of the inadequacy of trial counsel in petitioner's direct appeal or-
dinarily constitutes a waiver of this issue." Hollonquest v. State, - Ind. -
432 N.E.2d 37, 39 (1982). In Davis, the court suggested that the state could not prevail
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III. EVISCERATION OF THE KNOWING, VOLUNTARY AND INTELLIGENT
WAIVER STANDARD.
A) Waiver By Failure To Object At Trial.
In Langley,70 one of the justifications offered for application of
the rule that errors not objected to at trial are waived was that such
a rule prevents a litigant from withholding the objection at trial for
strategic reasons and then asserting the claim on appeal. Langley's
dicta on this point relied on Henry v. Mississippi7 1 for the proposition
that a binding waiver may be imputed from counsel to the defendant
when a defendant is effectively represented by counsel and counsel
foregoes an objection.7 2 The Indiana Supreme Court has extended the
Henry binding waiver analysis to reach the conclusion that a post-
conviction petitioner may not raise issues which could have been raised
in the original trial." A knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver is
on a waiver claim arising by reason of the petitioner's failure to raise the issue of
trial counsel's effectiveness on direct appeal if the same counsel represented petitioner
at trial and on direct appeal. Davis appears to assume that a lawyer is unlikely to
raise the question of his or her effectiveness. Therefore, such circumstances probably
constitute a "mitigating circumstance" sufficient to rebut the waiver arising by reason
of the defendant's failure to raise the issue of counsel's effectiveness on direct appeal.
In McKinley v. State, 253 Ind. 187, 252 N.E.2d 420 (1969), the court suggested
that an issue which was waived for purposes of direct appeal would be available to
the petitioner in a P.C. 1 proceeding. See supra text accompanying note 38. In Greer
v. State, 262 Ind. 622, 321 N.E.2d 842, the court suggested that the McKinley dicta
was based on the ground that the defendant's appellate counsel had been appointed
just one business day prior to the last day on which a motion for a new trial could
be filed. Thus, according to the Greer court, it would have been unfair to penalize
the defendant in McKinley by denying post-conviction review. The Greer court seemed
to be suggesting that the lack of time to prepare a comprehensive motion to correct
errors (the current equivalent of a motion for a new trial) would constitute a mitigating
circumstance sufficient to excuse the antecedent waiver and permit post-conviction
review. The McKinley opinion does note that appellate counsel was appointed one
business day prior to the last day for filing such a motion. However, the motion had
already been .filed by trial counsel at the time appellate counsel was appointed. McKinley,
253 Ind. at 189-92, 252 N.E.2d at 421-22. The defendant in McKinley was in no dif-
ferent position than any other defendant. Despite the characterization made in Greer,
the McKinley opinion is grounded squarely on the notion that the "waiver" rules ap-
plicable on direct appeal are not applicable to post-conviction proceedings.
In any event, the circumstances characterized in Davis and Greer seem to be
the only recognized exceptions to the proposition that ineffective assistance of counsel
is the only "sufficient" reason to justify the waiver which arises from a failure to
raise an issue in a timely fashion.
70. 256 Ind. 199, 267 N.E.2d 538 (1971).
71. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
72. Langley, 256 Ind. at 206, 267 N.E.2d at 542.
73. See Cummings v. State, - Ind. -, - 434 N.E.2d 90, 91 (1982). "It
is well settled that in a petition for post-conviction relief the appellant may not raise
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conclusively presumed from the failure to raise an issue." Such a con-
clusion does not follow if the trial default occurred by reason of in-
advertence, nor does the Henry case compel such a conclusion.
In Henry,'- counsel for the defendant failed to object to the ad-
mission of evidence which was later claimed to have been obtained
illegally," thereby failing to comply with Mississippi's contemporaneous
objection rule." Despite the non-compliance, the Mississippi Supreme
Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the evidence was
obtained illegally."8 The court acted on the erroneous assumption that
the defendant was represented only by nonresident counsel unfamiliar
with the Mississippi procedural rule. 9 Thereafter, the State pointed
out that the defendant was represented by local counsel as well as
nonresident counsel."0 The Mississippi Supreme Court then withdrew
its first opinion and affirmed the conviction holding that the defen-
dant had waived his right to object to the illegally obtained evidence
by failing to object contemporaneously with its admission.8
an issue which was or could have been raised in his original trial." Id. See also Holt
v. State, __ Ind. - , 408 N.E.2d 538 (1980); Bryant v. State, __ Ind. __, 406
N.E.2d 1177 (1980); Riner v. State, 271 Ind. 578, 394 N.E.2d 140 (1979, Eliacin v. State,
269 Ind. 305, 380 N.E.2d 548 (1978).
74. The case law is clear that the failure to raise an issue timely gives rise
to a "waiver." If the state claims such a "waiver" occurred by reason of the prior
procedural default, or if the issue is raised by the court sua sponte, the petitioner
must then demonstrate circumstances that would satisfactorily mitigate or excuse the
petitioner's failure to perfect his remedy through normal procedural channels. Rinard
v. State, 271 Ind. 588, 592, 394 N.E.2d 160, 163 (1979) (court may raise waiver sua
sponte); Dull v. State, 267 Ind. 549, 553-554, 372 N.E2d 171, 173-74 (1978); Langley
v. State, 256 Ind. 199, 211, 267 N.E.2d 538, 545 (1971); Wilkins v. State, - Ind. App.
- 426 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1981) (burden on petitioner to justify his failure to object).
P.C. 1 S 8 suggests that even a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver may
be excused on proof of sufficient reason to justify the previous omission. However,
the cases noted above do not discuss whether the procedural default was knowing,
intelligent and voluntary. Rather, waiver is presumed from the prior default and the
burden then shifts to the petitioner to justify the previous omission. See, e.g., Har-
rison v. State, 166 Ind. App. 602, 337 N.E.2d 533 (1979) (defendant's failure to object
to admission of evidence when represented by competent counsel results in binding
waiver of issue despite counsel's concession that no objection was made because of
counsel's ignorance of the necessity of an objection at trial after an unsuccessful mo-
tion to suppress). Counsel's inadvertence is not an adequate justification. Id.
75. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
76. Id. at 444.




81. Id. at 446. For the opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court, see Henry
v. Mississippi, 154 So.2d 289 (1963).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2 The Court
found that the contemporaneous objection rule served a legitimate
state purpose by providing the trial court with the opportunity to
avoid error. However, the Court noted that this purpose may have
been fulfilled by counsel moving for a directed verdict at the close
of the State's case on the ground that the evidence was obtained
illegally. The Court did not decide this issue.s Rather, it remanded
the case for a determination of whether counsel had deliberately
withheld making the objection.' The Court noted that:
Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior
consultation with an accused will not, where the cir-
cumstances are exceptional, preclude the accused from
asserting constitutional claims, see Whitus v. Balkcom, 333
F.2d 496 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1964), we think that the deliberate
bypassing by counsel of the contemporaneous-objection rule
as a part of trial strategy would have that effect in this
case.8
6
The holding in Henry that a waiver by counsel could legitimately bar
the assertion of a claim of constitutional error by the accused in state
or federal courts87 was expressly conditioned on counsel's conduct
amounting to a "deliberate choice of ... strategy."8 A second factor
should also be considered in determining whether counsel's deliberate
act binds the client. That area of inquiry is whether the right is of
a type which counsel may waive on behalf of the client or is of a
nature which requires action by the client. 9
82. Henry v. Mississippi, 376 U.S. 904 (1964).
83. 379 U.S. at 448-449.
84. Id. at 449.
85. Id. at 453.
86. Id. at 452-453.
87. Henry's case was before the Court on certiorari to the Mississippi Supreme
Court. Justice Brennan may have intended to limit the effect of the holding that
counsel's deliberate acts could be imputed to the accused to cases on direct review.
It is not clear that the Court intended to imply that such imputed conduct would
also bar federal habeas review. The confusion results from the following statement:
"[A] dismissal on the basis of an adequate state ground would not end this case; peti-
tioner might still pursue vindication of his federal claim in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding in which the procedural default will not alone preclude consideration of
his claim, at least unless it is shown that petitioner deliberately bypassed the orderly
procedure of the state courts." Henry, 379 U.S. at 452. See L. YACKLE, supra note 5,
at S 78.
88. Henry, 379 U.S. at 451.
89. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that an attorney's usurpa-
tion of certain fundamental decisions may violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Anders
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https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss2/1
1984] INADVERTENT PROCEDURAL DEFAULTS
While the Langley decision appears to recognize the wisdom of
requiring that counsel's conduct be deliberate before a knowing and
intelligent waiver can be imputed from lawyer to client,0 the deci-
sion also embraced the proposition that in order for errors to be ap-
pealable an objection must be lodged at trial to permit the trial court
to avoid error. At least one case decided after Langley acknowledges
that someone's conduct, be it that of counsel or accused, has to be delib-
erate in order to find a knowing and intelligent waiver." Later cases fail
to consider the question of whether a claim which could have been
but was not raised at trial was foregone by counsel as a deliberate
choice of strategy so as to preclude subsequent review under the
Henry notion of imputed waiver. 3 The cases assume such a waiver
from the failure to raise an issue at trial without inquiring whether
counsel's failure was deliberate or inadvertent.94 The state of current
Indiana law is clear:
It is well settled that in a petition for post-conviction relief
the appellant may not raise an issue which was or could
have been raised in his original trial.9
In short, the failure to provide the trial court with the opportunity
to avoid error in the original proceedings precludes post-conviction
review absent a showing of mitigating circumstances.
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Moreover,
the Court has recognized that certain rights may be waived only with the personal
participation of the accused. Such rights include: the right to a jury trial, Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); the right to appeal, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 191 (1963);
the right to counsel, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and the right to decide
whether to plead guilty and therefore waive the rights which a guilty plea necessarily
surrenders, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (requirement that a guilty plea
be voluntary obviously mandates personal participation). In general, the power to make
trial strategy decisions rest with counsel. Henry, 379 U.S. 443.
90. Langley v. State, 256 Ind. 199, 206, 267 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1981). "[Sluch
a requirement bars a litigant from asserting error on appeal, objection to which he
chose to forego for strategic reasons at trial." Id.
91. Id. at 206, 267 N.E.2d at 542.
92. Dixon v. State, 154 Ind. App. 603, 613, 290 N.E.2d 731, 737 (1972). "Waiver
on Dixon's part . . .might be inferred because failure to present the impeaching
testimony ... was by its very nature within the knowledge of Dixon, and he knowingly
and voluntarily relinquished the right to present it .. " Id.
93. Cummings v. State, __ Ind. , 434 N.E.2d 90 (1982); Holt v. State,
Ind. - 408 N.E.2d 538 (1980); Riner v. State, 271 Ind. 578, 394 N.E.2d 140
(1979); Eliacin v. State, 269 Ind. 305, 380 N.E.2d 548 (1978).
94. See Cummings, - Ind. at - , 434 N.E.2d at 91; Holt, _ Ind. at __
408 N.E.2d at 540; Riner, 271 Ind. at 582, 394 N.E.2d at 144; Eliacin, 269 Ind. at 307,
380 N.E.2d at 549.
95. Cummings, __ Ind. at __, 434 N.E.2d at 91 (1982).
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The irony is obvious. P.C. 1 provides that the failure to assert
a claim constitutes a waiver of the right to seek post-conviction relief
on that claim if the claim was "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence.
.. "' Even if a court finds a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver,
the waiver may be excused under the rule if the post-conviction court
finds sufficient reason for the prior procedural default.' The rule
assumes that not all claims of error will be presented timely in the
original proceedings but concludes that such a failure should not bar
review in post-conviction proceedings absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver of such claims. Indiana case law nevertheless compels the con-
clusion that such a waiver may be imputed from counsel to client
without inquiry as to whether counsel's conduct was deliberate. The
failings of such an analysis are best demonstrated by the case of
Wilkins v. State."
Loren Wilkins was convicted of first degree burglary.9 At his
trial the jury was instructed that if they believed the State's evidence
showing the defendant in possession of stolen property soon after the
burglary and if the defendant failed to explain that possession to their
satisfaction, an inference would be raised that the accused was guilty
of the burglary. Such an instruction had been condemned by the
Indiana Court of Appeals approximately two years prior to the
Wilkins' trial. 100 Nevertheless, Wilkins' counsel failed to object.0 '
Wilkins was convicted. Two years later he sought post-conviction relief
claiming, inter alia, that the trial court committed fundamental error
by giving the instruction and that his counsel was incompetent for
failing to object.0 2 Wilkins' counsel conceded that he was unaware
of the objectionable nature of the instruction and thus did not object.0 3
96. P.C. 1 S 8.
97. Id.
98. - Ind. App. -, 426 N.E.2d 61 (1981).
99. Id. at __, 426 N.E.2d at 62.
100. See Abel v. State, 165 Ind. App. 664, 333 N.E.2d 848 (1975).
101. Wilkins at _ 426 N.E.2d at 63.
102. Id.
103. Id. at __, 426 N.E.2d at 72-73 (Staton, J., dissenting). The following col-
loquy appeared in the transcript of the post-conviction hearing:
"Q: Were you aware at that time that there were several cases holding
that such an instruction is improper and prejudicial to the
defendant?
A: I don't believe I knew there were several cases holding that at
that time."
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In addressing the issues, the court observed that since the de-
fendant (more properly his counsel) did not object to the erroneous
instruction, that particular claim of error was waived for purposes
of post-conviction review. 0 4 The majority then found that giving the
instruction did not constitute fundamental error and the isolated
mistake made by counsel did not render the proceedings a mockery
of justice so as to require a finding that counsel was ineffective.'05
The majority expressly found that the failure to object was not a
calculated decision.' The dissent would have found that Wilkins'
counsel was ineffective, but accepted the premise that the "absence
of an objection closed the avenue of post-conviction relief which would
have vindicated Wilkins' claim of prejudicial error."'0 7 Thus, both the
majority and the dissent apparently accepted the proposition that a
knowing and intelligent waiver can result even though the defendant
and his counsel are unaware of the occurrence of error.
The Indiana case law rule that issues not raised at trial are
waived for post-conviction purposes, without further inquiry, is flatly
inconsistent with the language of P.C. 1 S 8 which requires a know-
ing, intelligent and voluntary waiver before a claim is rendered
unavailable for post-conviction review. The case law rule seems to
be partially based upon the imputed waiver doctrine of Henry."' Cases
such as Wilkins demonstrate how far the case law rule has strayed
from the Henry doctrine. Wilkins is inconsistent with Henry because
the latter clearly requires a deliberate act by counsel."°9 The effect
of such a rule is that the burden of counsel's inadvertent omission
falls on the client with little possibility of relief."'
104. Id. at __, 426 N.E.2d at 64.
105. Id.
106. Id. "Here defense counsel's failure to object to the instruction clearly was
not a calculated move of trial strategy, and was at worst a mistake." Id.
107. Id. at __, 426 N.E.2d at 66.
108. See Langley, 256 Ind. at 206, 267 N.E.2d at 542.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 75-88.
110. The dissent observed that it "shocks the conscience" that the burden of
defense counsel's omission fell on the defendant. Wilkins, - Ind. at - , 426 N.E.2d
at 74. The dissent's reference is to the Indiana standard governing the right to effec-
tive counsel-reversal is required if counsel's mistakes reduce the trial to a farce and
mockery shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court. See supra note 167. See
also Wilkins, - Ind. at - , 426 N.E.2d at 62. The statement appears to have been
intended as a response to the majority's conclusion that counsel's overall conduct did
not violate the defendant's right to counsel. No member of the court considered the
possibility that a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver should not be imputed
from counsel to client when counsel was unaware of the underlying claim.
1984]
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B) Post-Trial Defaults.
In Kidwell v. State,"' the petitioner raised issues regarding the
voluntariness of his confession, the admission of evidence acquired
as a result of the confession and the effect of pretrial publicity on
his trial.112 A majority of the Indiana Supreme Court found that all
issues raised by Kidwell's post-conviction petition were asserted by
his trial counsel in a motion for a new trial filed after Kidwell's con-
viction in 1964.113 On direct appeal Kidwell's appellate counsel did not
pursue all of the thirty-five claimed errors asserted in the motion for
a new trial." ' The majority therefore concluded that Kidwell was at-
tempting to accomplish that which the post-conviction rules prohibit,
i.e., pursuing a second appeal by asserting questions which were or
could have been raised in his direct appeal.115 The language of the
rule relied on to support this contention was found in P.C. l(A)(2)1
which provided: "This remedy is not a substitute for a direct appeal
from the conviction and all available steps including those under Post-
Conviction Remedy Rule 2 should be taken to perfect such an appeal
"9117
The precise basis for the Kidwell holding is not clear. On the
facts of the case, the majority could easily have concluded that ap-
pellate counsel made a tactical decision not to assert the issues subse-
quently raised by Kidwell's post-conviction petition."8 Reliance on
Henry v. Mississippi 9 for the proposition that deliberate choices of
strategy by counsel would bind the client would have provided the
springboard for finding a knowing and intelligent waiver by counsel
imputable to Kidwell." However, conspicuously absent from the opin-
111. 260 Ind. 303, 295 N.E.2d 362 (1973).
112. Id. at 307, 295 N.E.2d at 364.
113. Id.
114. Id. To review the opinion resolving the direct appeal, see Kidwell v. State,
249 Ind. 430, 230 N.E.2d 590 (1967).
115. 260 Ind. at 308-09, 295 N.E.2d at 365.
116. P.C. 1(A)(2) was subsequently altered stylistically and its denomination
changed to P.C. 1 5 1(b). The content is for all intents and purposes identical.
117. P.C. l(A)(2), reprinted in Kidwell, 260 Ind. at 306, 295 N.E.2d at 364. See
supra note 116.
118. The court in fact stated that appellate counsel "chose" not to pursue all
thirty-five grounds. Kidwell, 260 Ind. at 307, 295 N.E.2d at 364.
119. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
120. Finding such an imputable waiver does not eliminate the possibility that
the failure of counsel to consult with the defendant regarding the abandonment of
issues for purposes of direct appeal may constitute a mitigating circumstance suffi-
cient to excuse the waiver. See Jones v. Barnes, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3314 (1983) (Blackmun,
J., concurring). See also infra note 125.
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ion is any discussion of whether Kidwell, by his own conduct or that
of his counsel, waived the issues asserted under the knowing, volun-
tary and intelligent standard. The court did examine whether counsel's
failure to present the claims on direct appeal amounted to improper
representation of the defendant.' Such an inquiry is appropriate under
Langley122 to determine whether a waiver may be excused by reason
of mitigating circumstances. It is arguable that the court, sub silen-
tio, applied a knowing and intelligent waiver standard before address-
ing the question whether mitigating circumstances existed. It is not,
however, clear that this was the case.
Confusion regarding the basis for the decision arises as a conse-
quence of the majority's construction of the language in P.C. 1 which
provides: "This remedy is not a substitute for a direct appeal from
the conviction . .".1."" The majority read this language as a specific
prohibition against raising, via P.C. 1, those issues which could have
been raised in the original appeal."4 The majority seemed to be ad-
vancing a finality rule unrelated to the petitioner's conduct. It would
not be necessary to determine that an issue was knowingly and in-
telligently waived in order to find that the petitioner could have raised
the issue on appeal but did not do so.' 5 Such a construction of P.C.
121. Kidwell, 260 Ind. at 307-08, 295 N.E.2d at 364-65.
122. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
123. P.C. 1 S 1(b).
124. Kidwell, 260 Ind. at 308-09, 295 N.E.2d at 365. "He now comes before this
Court seeking to do that which the above quoted rule specifically prohibits, i.e., he
now seeks what in fact amounts to a second appeal .. " Id.
125. The "could have been raised" language is subject to at least two inter-
pretations. One could define the language as posing a simple objective test. If the
claim made in post-conviction procedures could have been raised on direct appeal, failure
to do so forfeits the claim. On the other hand, one could construe the language as
setting forth a subjective test which turns on the defendant's knowledge. If the test
is subjective- "could have been raised by this defendant"-the defendant's knowledge
of the existence of the claim or lack thereof would be controlling. A defendant could
not have raised a claim of which he was unaware.
In Kidwell's case, the majority noted that trial counsel's objections at trial
demonstrated that he was aware of the claims which were subsequently asserted in
the post-conviction petition but which were not pursued on direct appeal. Kidwell, 260
Ind. at 307, 295 N.E.2d at 364. The dissent took issue with this factual conclusion.
Id. at 310, 295 N.E.2d at 366. If we assume the majority is correct, a finding that
Kidwell was aware of the claims at the time of direct appeal and yet failed to assert
them on appeal does not equate necessarily to a knowing, intelligent and voluntary
waiver. The abandonment of grounds on appeal may be a result of institutional con-
straints and not a product of free choice on the part of the appellate advocate or
his client. Justice Jackson has observed: "The mind of an appellate judge is habitually
receptive to the suggestion that a lower court committed error. But receptiveness
declines as the number of assigned errors increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of con-
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1 would pose a pure procedural bar which would operate to preclude
assertion of a right regardless of whether the petitioner could be said
to have voluntarily surrendered that right.2 ' This construction con-
tradicts the "knowingly" and "intelligently" language of P.C. 1 § 8,
which poses a rule intended to operate as a corollary to the underly-
ing right and addresses the question whether protection of the right
itself has been foregone deliberately. 7
The Indiana Supreme Court again emphasized the "could have
raised on appeal" analysis in Brown v. State.28 Brown was charged
with first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder."'
Brown appealed and his conviction was affirmed.'" Thereafter, Brown
sought P.C. 1 relief alleging, inter alia, that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction."' The court addressed the merits
of the issue only after noting that the proper time to raise the issue
of insufficiency is on direct appeal. The court reiterated that the P.C.
1 remedy is not a substitute for direct appeal and held that the scope
of post-conviction review does not include issues which were available
to a petitioner on direct appeal."' However, the court appeared to
define "available" as known to the petitioner or his counsel and in-
dicated that it is incumbent on a petitioner to demonstrate that the
issue was unknown to him or his counsel to escape application of the
waiver doctrine.'
fidence in any one." Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court, 25 TEMP. L. Q. 115,
119 (1951).
Indeed, in Jones v. Barnes, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (1983), the Court rejected a claim
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert all colorable issues which
the client wanted pressed on appeal. The basis for the decision was that the very
function of a good advocate is to select the best arguments for assertion on appeal.
Time limits on arguments and page limits on briefs require such professional judgments
be made. Applying this rationale to Kidwell, one could question whether appellate
counsel's decision not to pursue all thirty-five instances of claimed error must inevitably
be considered a voluntary abandonment of those issues not asserted.
126. See supra note 13.
127. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for the language of the post-
conviction waiver rule. See supra note 13 regarding the distinction regarding waiver
and procedural defaults. See also Dixon v. State, 154 Ind. App. 603, 290 N.E.2d 731 (1972).
128. 261 Ind. 619, 308 N.E.2d 699 (1974).
129. Brown was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id.
130. Brown v. State, 255 Ind. 594, 265 N.E.2d 699 (1971).
131. 261 Ind. 619, 308 N.E.2d 699.
132. Id. at 622, 308 N.E.2d at 700.
133. Id. "[T]he defendant failed in his burden to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence either that the evidence which he asserts was essential to his convic-
tion was devoid of probative value or that the circumstances which render such evidence
infirm were unknown to him and his counsel at the time of trial. It was incumbent
upon him to prove both .. " Id.
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At this stage the Indiana Supreme Court appeared to be
employing a hybrid waiver analysis regarding post-trial defaults.
Failure to raise an issue on direct appeal would constitute a waiver
unless the defendant could demonstrate that the issue was unknown
to him or his counsel.'34 Such a standard is different from the usual
contemporaneous objection rule since that rule operates without regard
to the defendant's conduct. Nor did the court apply the knowing, volun-
tary and intelligent waiver standard. A defendant or his counsel may
be aware of an issue, fail to assert it and yet not voluntarily abandon
the claim."5
The court added further confusion regarding the nature of the
waiver doctrine by its opinion in Lamb v. State."' Lamb pled guilty
to second degree murder and thereafter sought post-conviction relief
based, in part, on rather vague assertions that his rights under the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment as well as the sixth amendment were violated.'37 Lamb's first
pro se petition was denied after a hearing; a belated motion to cor-
rect errors was filed and overruled.'' Thereafter, the defendant filed
a second pro se petition entitled "Petition to Withdraw Guilty Plea
and Vacate Judgment."'39 This petition was denied by the trial court
on the theory that P.C. 1 S 8 requires all available grounds to be
raised in the original petition. 4' Thereafter, Lamb filed a third peti-
tion claiming that the multiple penalty provisions of the second degree
murder statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and that its coercive effect violated his rights under the
sixth amendment as well as his rights under the Indiana Constitution.'
This petition was also denied by the trial court on the theory that
all issues raised in that petition had been determined in the pro-
ceedings related to the defendant's first petition.'' Lamb was again
permitted to file a belated motion to correct errors regarding denial
of the third petition; Lamb argued that the trial court erred in sum-
marily dismissing the petition. This motion was overruled on the basis
134. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 263 Ind. 327, 330 N.E.2d 738, 742 (1975); Smith
v. State, 268 Ind. 79, 373 N.E.2d 884 (1978). But see also Gross v. State, 162 Ind. App.
649, 320 N.E.2d 818 (1975) (finding a ground available without addressing whether the
defendant was subjectively aware of the ground).
135. See supra note 125.
136. 263 Ind. 137, 325 N.E.2d 180 (1975).
137. Id. at 140, 325 N.E.2d at 182.
138. Id. at 141, 325 N.E.2d at 182.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 141, 325 N.E.2d at 182-183.
142. Id. at 141, 325 N.E.2d at 182.
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that Lamb could have raised the issues presented by his third peti-
tion in his first post-conviction petition."' Lamb was then permitted
to take a belated appeal regarding denial of the first petition and
denial of the third petition. "
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's action of
summarily dismissing Lamb's third petition. While the court reiterated
that the purpose of P.C. 1 was to provide for full and fair review
of claims of error, it added that this purpose applied only to claims
not reviewable upon direct appeal.' Contrary to the trial court ruling,
the court found that the defendant had not presented the issues arising
from the multiple sentencing alternatives permissible under the second
degree murder statute in his first petition. However, the court ruled
that those issues were available at the time the first petition was
filed and the failure to raise those claims in that petition resulted
in their forfeiture. Thus, the court upheld the summary dismissal of
Lamb's third petition.
Quite clearly, the construction given to the word "available" in
Lamb was not tied to the defendant's knowledge. The court in Lamb
applied a pure finality rule-if claims could have been raised in a prior
post-conviction proceeding but were not raised, the claims are waived
for state post-conviction purposes. The court's refusal to provide the
defendant with any opportunity to argue that the claims were not
"available" in the sense that he was unaware of those claims permits
no other conclusion to be drawn. In dissent, Justice DeBruler noted
that the ruling was tantamount to a holding that the defendant know-
ingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the right to litigate his claims
and that such a waiver should not be presumed on the record as it
existed.'46 The dissent also observed that the prosecution carries the
burden of raising and proving the defense of waiver.'47
It is probably more accurate to conclude that the majority aban-
doned the knowing and intelligent standard, at least in Lamb, than
to say that the majority ruling constitutes a holding that the defend-
ant waived the claims of error under that standard. The latter ra-
tionale was not addressed by the majority nor is it supportable from
the court's rendition of the facts. Further, notwithstanding the dis-
sent's assertion to the contrary, the case law is absolutely clear that
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 144-45, 325 N.E.2d at 184.
146. Id. at 148, 325 N.E.2d at 186.
147. Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1984], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss2/1
INADVERTENT PROCEDURAL DEFAULTS
the burden of raising the waiver defense is on the state. However,
once raised, the defendant carries the burden of demonstrating
mitigating circumstances to overcome the waiver conclusion spawned
by the simple failure to object.148
Some cases decided after Lamb49 rekindle the notion that the
failure to raise an issue in proceedings subsequent to trial constitutes
a waiver only if the issue was known to the defendant.1" Other cases
do not discuss whether the claim must be subjectively known to the
petitioner but instead simply propose that issues which could have
been but were not raised on direct appeal are waived for purposes
of post-conviction proceedings."' Indeed, it appears from the present
state of Indiana case law that inconsistent rules govern judicial
analysis of waiver by default on direct appeal. The Indiana appellate
courts will sometimes find that the failure to raise an issue on appeal
constitutes a waiver without determining whether such a waiver was
knowing, intelligent and voluntary.'52 On other occasions, the appellate
courts appear to require a finding that the issue not previously
asserted by the defendant was known to him before finding such a
148. In Langley, the court suggested that the burden was on the state to assert
and prove that the alleged error was waived. 256 Ind. at 213 n.4, 267 N.E.2d at 546.
This language is inconsistent with other language in that case which suggests that
once the waiver issue is raised, the "petitioner must then present some substantial
basis . . . which would . . . mitigate his failure to pursue . . . a remedy through the
normal procedural channels." Id. at 207, 267 N.E.2d at 542. Subsequent decisions in-
dicate that the issue may be raised sua sponte. Rinard v. State, 271 Ind. 588, 394 N.E.2d
160 (1979). Once raised, the defendant must seek to be excused from the waiver finding
with proof of sufficient reason to justify the procedural omission. Dull v. State, 267
Ind. 549, 554, 372 N.E.2d 171, 173-74 (1978). Baynard v. State, 162 Ind. App. 86, 90,
317 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1974); Wilkins v. State, __ Ind. App. , -, 426 N.E.2d
61, 65 (1981). See also P.C. 1 S 8, supra text accompanying note 31.
149. 263 Ind. 137, 325 N.E.2d 180 (1975).
150. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 263 Ind. 327, 332, 330 N.E.2d 738, 742. "There
has been no showing that the matters claimed were not known or were otherwise
unavailable .. " Id.
151. See, e.g., Eliacin v. State, 269 Ind. 305, 380 N.E.2d 548 (1978) (no discus-
sion of knowledge); Henson v. State, __ Ind. ., , 436 N.E.2d 79, 81 (1982).
"The failure to raise the issue of the inadequacy of his trial counsel in petitioner's
direct appeal ordinarily constitutes a waiver on this issue." Id.
152. Jewell v. State, 73 Ind. Dec. 52, 397 N.E.2d 946 (1979) (issue regarding
impermissible inconsistency in judgments between co-defendants became available when
co-defendant pled guilty-availability determined solely by reference to date when
issue arose). Lamb v. State, 263 Ind. 137, 325 N.E.2d 180 (1975). See also McKinley
v. State, 163 Ind. App. 605, 325 N.E.2d 470 (1975); Kissinger v. State, 161 Ind. App.
303, 315 N.E.2d 423 (1974) (court presumed waiver from the simple failure to assert
issue on appeal without inquiry as to whether the defendants were aware of the respec-
tive claims at the time of direct appeal).
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waiver." On the basis of existing case law, it is not possible to predict
which analysis will be utilized to resolve any particular case.
IV. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES-THE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE RULE
P.C. 1 S 8 provides that any ground which has been knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived may not be a basis for relief
"unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for suffi-
cient reason was not asserted" in prior proceedings." The Indiana
Supreme Court has described the rule as follows:
For relief to be granted where the element of waiver has
been introduced at the post-conviction hearing, there must
be some substantial basis or circumstance presented which
would satisfactorily mitigate a petitioner's failure to have
pursued or perfected a remedy through the normal pro-
cedural routes.'
The court has failed to articulate any principles to be utilized in deter-
mining what constitutes a mitigating circumstance sufficient to excuse
a procedural default" but it has identified ineffective assistance of
counsel as one "persuasive circumstance.""' 7 So few other circumstances
have been recognized as sufficient to justify a default that one can
conclude that "mitigating circumstances" essentially means ineffective
assistance of counsel.'" Indeed, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated
that this is the rule.
159
In Langley, ' the court observed that "where it could be shown
that the alleged waiver resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel"
the procedural default should not be binding on the client.'' This
153. Brown v. State, 261 Ind. 619, 308 N.E.2d 699 (1974). See also cases cited
supra note 134.
154. P.C. 1 S 8, supra text accompanying note 31.
155. Langley, 256 Ind. at 207, 267 N.E.2d at 542.
156. The term "procedural default" is used since the case law suggests that
the court is actually employing a rule which results in the forfeiture of claims not
raised timely subject to proof of mitigating circumstances to excuse the default. This
rule focuses on the procedural requirement that requires timely assertion of a right
to avoid forfeiture as opposed to "waiver" which connotes a knowing and voluntary
surrender of the right. See supra note 13.
157. Langley, 256 Ind. at 211, 267 N.E.2d at 545.
158. See supra note 69.
159. Davis v. State, 263 Ind. 327, 332, 330 N.E.2d 738, 742 (1979). "Absent a
showing of ineffective representation, . . . such matter would be deemed waived." Id.
160. 256 Ind. 199, 267 N.E.2d 538 (1971).
161. Id. at 211, 267 N.E.2d at 545. See also supra notes 41-63 and accompanying
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language would suggest that the ineffective assistance inquiry should
focus on the conduct of counsel in failing to raise or otherwise preserve
the claimed error for review. Moreover, Langley's holding that a
lawyer's decisions bind the client is based on the premise that a
litigant should not be able to assert a claim on appeal which was not
asserted at trial for tactical reasons. As noted earlier, the court relied
on the Henry"6 ' doctrine that deliberate decisions of the lawyer bind
the client" to support the imputed waiver theory advanced in Langley.
Thus, the inquiry to determine whether the lawyer's act or omission
binds the client should focus only on the lawyer's act or omission which
gave rise to the imputed waiver." The effectiveness of counsel in
conducting the entire trial is irrelevant to the narrower question of
whether an issue has been waived by counsel's conduct.
Indiana appellate courts have not so restricted the inquiry.
Rather, the courts examine the entirety of counsel's conduct to deter-
mine whether or not the defendant was denied the right to the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution165 and by the Indiana Constitution. 6'
A violation of these rights, under the test applied by the Indiana ap-
pellate courts, occurs only when the representation is so inadequate
as to reduce the trial, taken as a whole, to a mockery of justice. '
162. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
163. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Deliberate choices of strategy
bind the client since the lawyer's function is to utilize his or her professional judg-
ment in making the vast array of trial decisions which arise in the course of the criminal
trial. Such authority is necessary if the lawyer is to effectively represent the accused.
The exigencies of trial require that the lawyer make such decisions without consulta-
tion with the client.
164. As previously suggested, the central question should be whether counsel
acted deliberately or inadvertently in failing to assert the claim at issue. See supra
text accompanying notes 70-88. There is no need to assess effectiveness in any other
sense for purposes of determining whether the lawyer's omission should bind the client.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
166. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
167. Rahim v. State, Ind. __, 417 N.E.2d 343 (1981). "In order to prevail,
a defendant must show that his representation was so inadequate as to reduce the
trial, taken as a whole, to a mockery of justice." Id. at __, 417 N.E.2d at 345. See
also Baker v. State, - Ind. , 403 N.E2d 1069, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 882 (1980);
Huggins v. State, __ Ind. -, 403 N.E.2d 332 (1980). The farce and mockery test
was theoretically modified by the "adequate legal representation" test in Thomas v.
State, 251 Ind. 546, 242 N.E.2d 919 (1969). The language of Thomas suggests that ade-
quate legal representation is that which rises above perfunctory representation. Per-
functory representation is equated with reducing the trial to a mockery. Crisp v. State,
271 Ind. 534, 394 N.E.2d 115 (1979). Apparently, if an attorney does not reduce the
proceedings to a farce or mockery, the representation is adequate. Recent cases refer
to and define the standard used to determine ineffective assistance solely as the farce
and mockery test. See Howland v. State, - Ind. ., 442 N.E.2d 1081 (1982); Cum-
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By utilizing such an analysis, Indiana courts effectively require
a petitioner to demonstrate his entitlement to relief on sixth amend-
ment grounds before the petitioner can reach the merits of the issue
claimed to have been waived."M Furthermore, Indiana courts have held
that isolated mistakes of counsel do not per se render a lawyer
ineffective."9 Thus, as Wilkins demonstrated, a lawyer's inadvertent
surrender of a client's right due to the counsel's ignorance of the
right's very existence does not necessarily render counsel ineffective.
In such cases the underlying right will be deemed waived absent a
finding of ineffectiveness in the context of the total trial. 7 '
Use of this analysis renders any claim of error independent of
the ineffectiveness issue either barred or superfluous. A finding that
the petitioner has failed to establish that his counsel's total trial con-
duct amounted to ineffective assistance equates to a finding that the
petitioner has failed to prove mitigating circumstances sufficient to
excuse the procedural default; review of the underlying claim is
therefore barred. A finding that counsel provided ineffective assistance
entitles the petitioner to relief on that ground alone without reference
to the underlying issue. The underlying issue is thus rendered
superfluous. In effect, the petitioner is punished for the prior pro-
cedural default, be it inadvertent or knowing, voluntary and intelligent,
by being required to prove a violation of a fundamental right, i.e.,
the right to counsel, 7' in order to secure relief in a post-conviction
proceeding. The focus is not on the underlying claim which was the
subject of the procedural default nor on the nature of the prejudice
which resulted from the underlying error. Rather, the test employed
by the appellate courts focuses on whether a fundamental right distinct
mings v. State, - Ind. __, 434 N.E.2d 90 (1982); Cochran v. State, __ Ind. -,
445 N.E.2d 974 (1983).
168. Moreover, the particular standard utilized in Indiana, the "farce and
mockery" test, places a heavier burden on the defendant to demonstrate a sixth amend-
ment violation than that required by tests employed in other jurisdictions. See generally
C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND
CONCEPTS 545-46 (1980 and Supp. 1982).
169. See, e.g., Wilkins, - Ind. App. at __, 426 N.E.2d at 64. "It has been
held that although one isolated mistake does not necessarily amount to competent
counsel, neither does it result in a determination that counsel was incompetent....
A reviewing court must look to the totality of the facts and circumstances to find
whether the accused received competent representation." Id. See also Leaver v. State,
__ Ind. -, 414 N.E.2d 959 (1981).
170. Wilkins, - Ind. App. at _ 426 N.E.2d at 64. See also supra notes
105-114 and accompanying text.
171. Although the punishment aspect of the result may not be intended, it
nevertheless results from requiring a defendant to prove a violation of the right to
counsel to overcome the presumed waiver which arises from counsel's omission in failing
to assert an issue on a timely basis.
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from the underlying claim and itself sufficient to require relief has
been denied.''
V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS.
As suggested at the outset of this article, the law regarding col-
lateral attacks on criminal judgments must deal with two conflicting
premises: wrongful incarceration merits curative action even after final
judgment and final judgments merit protection.' 3 If the choice is made
to advance the availability of curative process, one creates a process
designed to resolve issues on the merits.' Such a system would pro-
vide for procedures which may be utilized at any time and which allow
the assertion of any ground not previously litigated or voluntarily sur-
rendered by the litigant seeking to assert the ground.' No sanction
would be imposed for inadvertent procedural defaults. Alternatively,
if one chooses to emphasize finality of judgments, issues not timely
raised would not be reviewable in any subsequent proceeding. The
contemporaneous objection rule serves such a function.' 8 A sanction
in the form of forfeiture of the underlying claim is imposed as a con-
sequence of the procedural default, without regard to whether the
default is inadvertent or deliberate.' Promoting finality diminishes
the availability of meaningful curative process and vice versa.
Therefore, the relevant questions are: 1) which choice of policy has
been made by P.C. 1; 2) which choice has been made by Indiana courts
in applying the rule; and 3) which choice or accommodation of policy
ought to be made.
The language of P.C. 1 establishes a process which may be util-
ized at any time and which appears to permit the assertion of all issues
not previously litigated nor knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
surrendered.' The rule imposes a penalty to the extent that it re-
172. See, e.g., Cummings v. State, - Ind. - 434 N.E.2d 90 (1982); Wilkins
v. State, __ Ind. App. , 426 N.E.2d 61 (1981).
173. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
174. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, commentary at 22-63. "Post-conviction
remedies exist to try fundamental issues that have not been tried before." Id.
175. Claims of error which have been fully litigated would not be available
for review because no purpose would be served by such relitigation. See supra note
11. The basis for precluding review of claims voluntarily surrendered is discussed in
the text accompanying note 197.
176. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977). Both cases discuss the value of the rule in promoting finality of criminal
judgments.
177. See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
178. P.C. 1 S 8. "Any ground finally adjudicated on the merits or not so raised
and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding . . . may not
be the basis for a subsequent petition .... " Id.
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quires the petitioner to establish grounds for relief by a preponderance
of the evidence.'79 This penalty arises because the petitioner failed
to utilize normal procedural channels to raise the claim. Depending
on the nature of the underlying claim, the imposition of such a sanc-
tion may be a very substantial penalty. 8 ' Nevertheless, the penalty
envisioned by the rule does not result in forfeiture of any claims:
rather, it relates only to the allocation of the burden of proof regarding
the underlying claim. In short, the rule as written advances primarily
a policy favoring the availability of curative process.
As was suggested by the earlier summary of Indiana law,'
Indiana appellate courts impose a penalty in addition to that con-
templated by P.C. 1. This penalty is of the forfeiture variety. It is
designed to promote finality and is imposed without regard to whether
the default was the product of conscious decision-making or of in-
advertence. The forfeiture penalty is applied to claims which could
have been raised at trial and sometimes is applied to claims of error
which could have been raised on direct appeal or in a prior post-
conviction proceeding. 8 ' The case law forfeiture rule is clearly incon-
sistent with the waiver language of P.C. 1 § 8, since that provision
envisions forfeiture of issues only if the same are knowingly, volun-
tarily and intelligently waived.
The case law rule is apparently intended to mitigate the disparate
results which occur when the knowing, intelligent and voluntary
waiver standard is applied to post-conviction proceedings and the con-
temporaneous objection rule is applied on direct appeal. Application
of the contemporaneous objection rule to an inadvertent trial default
would render the underlying claim unavailable on direct appeal for
want of a timely objection. 8 3 If the "knowingly," "intelligently" and
"voluntarily" language of P.C. 1 § 8 were read literally, the inadver-
179. P.C. 1 § 5. "The petitioner has the burden of establishing his grounds
for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
180. For example, if an accused objects to the fruits of a warrantless search
at trial, the prosecution carries the burden of proving that the search falls within
one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Smithers, 256
Ind. 512, 269 N.E.2d 874 (1971). If a petitioner raises the same claim in a post-conviction
proceeding, the petitioner carries the burden of demonstrating that the search was
not authorized by any exceptions to the warrant requirement. Johnson v. State, 262
Ind. 183, 313 N.E.2d 542 (1974).
181. See supra notes 34-153 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 67-153 and accompanying text.
183. The operation of the contemporaneous objection rule is not without ex-
ception. The fundamental error rule would permit review of egregious error. See infra
text accompanying notes 233-58.
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tent default would not bar post-conviction review of the same underly-
ing claim. The occurrence of such disparate results is reduced under
the case law by deeming counsel's failure to object to be a knowing
and intelligent waiver which is then imputed from counsel to client.
Application of this post-conviction waiver standard to a procedural
default then yields the same result as would the contemporaneous
objection rule.
Indiana's attempt to eliminate disparate results by imputing a
waiver from counsel's inadvertent omissions has resulted in the
decimation of the knowing and intelligent standard. The prospect of
overcoming the effect of such a procedural default for purposes of
post-conviction relief by establishing mitigating circumstances is in-
finitesimally small. Proof of mitigating circumstances under current
Indiana case law effectively means proving that counsel's total trial
conduct rendered the original proceedings a farce and mockery." Thus,
even if counsel concedes that he or she was unaware of an underlying
right which could have been invoked at trial, counsel's failure to assert
that previously unknown right will not be excused absent a finding
that counsel's representation as a whole denied the petitioner the ef-
fective assistance of counsel. Application of such a waiver standard
to post-conviction proceedings reduces the potential for disparate
results but also precludes use of such proceedings for any purpose
other than the assertion of a claim that a prisoner's sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel was denied at trial.185 In short,
Indiana case law reflects a policy favoring finality to the exclusion
or near exclusion of effective curative process.
The policy reflected in the Indiana case law is inconsistent with
the language of P.C. 1, unwarranted by finality considerations and
incompatible with the interest furthered by curative process. The need
exists for a post-conviction waiver standard which furthers the goal
of providing meaningful corrective process and accommodates the
State's interests in finality of judgments. This article will now attempt
to identify such a standard by examining the interests served by the
existence of curative process and those served by attaching finality
to criminal judgments, and by constructing an accommodation which
does not sacrifice the former to the latter.
184. See supra notes 154-70 and accompanying text.
185. The fundamental error doctrine applies to Indiana post-conviction pro-
ceedings as well as to proceedings on direct appeal. Thus, it is theoretically possible
for one to secure review of a claim despite the antecedent procedural default in raising
the claim if the same were deemed to be fundamental error. Very few errors rise
to the level of "fundamental error" as the term is defined and applied by Indiana
appellate courts. See infra notes 233-58 and accompanying text.
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A) The Nature of Curative Process.
The purpose of according rights is to insure that both the results
reached and the process by which those results are obtained are con-
sistent with fundamental notions of fairness as defined by our society's
shared value system and as identified in the historical experience of
that system.1" Fairness of result and of process must be analyzed both
at the level of individual cases and at a systems level.187 A defendant
has a right to counsel because the preference for the adversary system
in Anglo-American history has generated a perception that a fair result
is more likely if each side's case is effectively advocated. 88 Advocates
are restrained from using hearsay evidence unless its trustworthiness
is demonstrated because our collective experience has taught us that
first hand information is more trustworthy or factually accurate than
second hand information and because of our perception that a fair
result turns in large part on factual accuracy. '89
Rights and restraints do not exist in the abstract but are
designed to promote our understanding of that which constitutes a
fair and legitimate determination of guilt or innocence.19 If a defend-
ant is not accorded his rights or if his adversary is not appropriately
restrained, the reliability and legitimacy of the judgment reached is
called into question. To reach any other conclusion requires that one
assume that the rights or restraints afforded at trial are not mean-
ingful aspects of our collective understanding of that which provides
186. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
187. Providing for fairness of result and process at a systemic level sometimes
calls for the use of prophylactic rules such as that established by Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that a defendant be warned of his fifth amend-
ment rights prior to any in-custody interrogation by police. The purpose of the warn-
ings is to safeguard the citizen's constitutional rights by ensuring awareness of those
rights. Id. at 467. Failure to provide the warnings renders any confession tainted.
"No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this
right will suffice .. " Id. at 471-72. The Court made clear that "[w]e will not pause
to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without
a warning being given." Id. at 468. Thus the systemic rule may in some case provide
an unfair result in favor of an individual defendant for purposes of advancing fairness
at a broader level.
188. See supra note 24.
189. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE S 245 (E. Cleary, 2d ed.
1972). "[T]he Anglo-American tradition evolved three conditions under which witnesses
ordinarily will be required to testify: oath, personal presence at the trial, and cross-
examination. The rule against hearsay is designed to insure compliance with these
ideal conditions .. " Id. The right to cross-examination as a separate right was deemed
important enough to incorporate into the Bill of Rights. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
190. Supra note 21.
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a fair adjudication-that they are without value in promoting a fair
and legitimate determination of guilt or innocence. This is not to say
that every error requires reversal. Whether the reliability and
legitimacy of the result or judgment is sufficiently impugned to re-
quire that a new determination of guilt or innocence be made is a
collateral question which turns on the nature of error and its impact.91
The present point is simply that the integrity of the original adjudica-
tion is undermined by both the failure to accord an accused his rights
under rules established for the purpose of providing and promoting
a fair determination and the failure to assess the impact of that
deprivation on the legitimacy of the judgment.
This contention is applicable to civil cases as well as to criminal
proceedings. However, the interest to be protected by the rights ac-
corded the defendant in a criminal proceeding, i.e., liberty, has general-
ly been viewed as more important than the typical economic interest
protected by parallel rights in a civil proceeding." Moreover a govern-
ment, be it state or federal, is the party attempting to deprive an
accused of his liberty. Fear of the power of government and a recogni-
tion of the propensity for its abuse is both a central theme of the
American historical perspective and the underlying rationale of the
guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights.'93 The fear of governmental
abuse and the nature of the interest protected suggest that the finality
rule bend in favor of full litigation of the issues present in criminal
cases. This is true not only because of our sense of fairness owed
to a defendant but also because the public must perceive the system
to be fair.9 '
Because the failure to accord an accused any given right under-
mines the integrity of the result reached, one of the functions of
curative process is to provide an avenue for determining whether such
a failure occurred and, if so, to determine whether that failure suffi-
ciently impaired the validity of the underlying conviction so as to re-
quire relief. Such is a function of curative process whether the im-
plementing mechanism is review by the trial court following convic-
tion, direct appeal or a post-conviction proceeding. The purpose of
191. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for the notion that
not all constitutional errors occurring at trial warrant a reversal or new trial. The
Court concluded that "[tihere may be some constitutional errors which in the setting
of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent
with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless .. " Id. at 22.
192. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See also supra note 6.
193. Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64.
194. Id.
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the criminal process in its entirety is to provide a reliable and
legitimate determination of guilt or innocence.'95 Unless claims of error
raised, even belatedly, by a defendant are addressed on the merits,
it is not possible to determine either the nature of the error or its
probable impact. Absent such an inquiry, it is not possible to ascer-
tain whether the result obtained constitutes a fair and legitimate deter-
mination of guilt.
Denial of review on the merits frustrates the intended purpose
of curative process. Such a denial therefore requires justification. One
can accept the intentional relinquishment of a right as justification
for denying review of any claim of error based on the relinquished
right. This conclusion is acceptable because we recognize that a right
may be beneficial in some circumstances and an encumbrance in
others.'" If a litigant chooses to forego a right because of the
legitimate cost associated with its assertion, he has made a conscious
decision about what is best for his case. He reaps the benefits or suf-
fers the consequences of that decision and therefore is bound by his
act.197 Moreover, if the decision-making ability is properly entrusted
to the advocate for the accused with regard to assertion or non-
assertion of any given right, the advocate's decision should bind the
client.' 9
Whether an inadvertent procedural default should justify denial
of review is a much closer question. It is submitted that it should
not. This submission obviously calls for a departure from the contem-
poraneous objection rule. It is, however, not argued here that the rule
be abrogated for purposes of direct appeal. Legitimate institutional
interests may suggest that issues not timely raised in the trial court
should not be entertained on direct appeal.'99 The argument is instead
195. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965). "[Tlhe chief function of our
judicial machinery is to ascertain the truth." Id.
196. For example, assume a prosecutor desires to present the testimony of
a witness by use of an affidavit. A criminal defendant may have a right to confront
his accusers and a right to preclude the use of hearsay evidence, but he may choose
not to assert these rights if he believes that the live testimony of the witness will
be more damaging to him than the testimony contained in the affidavit. Since certain
costs attach to rights or their assertion, the accused is permitted to decide whether
he will assert his right and bear the cost, or escape the cost by non-assertion of the
right. See Rubin, supra note 13, at 488-89.
197. There are, however, certain rights which society may deem so important
as to preclude any waiver. See Rubin, supra note 13, at 494.
198. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
199. Direct appeal is and should be a reasonably expeditious process. Normally,
a direct appeal must be initiated shortly after the proceedings conclude in the trial
court. In Indiana, an appeal is commenced by filing a praecipe with the clerk of trial
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that at some point in the process a forum must be provided to address
claims on the merits despite an inadvertent procedural default in
failing to raise such claims in a timely manner.
The assumption underlying this argument is that the very pur-
pose of curative process is to determine whether there occurred a
failure to adhere to procedures designed to promote a fair and reliable
determination of guilt or innocence, i.e., whether the defendant's rights
were violated and, if so, whether that error requires relief. That such
is the function of curative process is dictated by the premise that
the ultimate function of a criminal trial is to provide a reliable deter-
mination of guilt or innocence. When an error occurs, the integrity
of the adjudication is diminished regardless of whether a timely ob-
jection is made. Unless countervailing interests may be said to
outweigh the threat presented by error to the integrity of the ad-
judication, the conclusion that an inadvertent default should not
preclude review of claimed error would follow automatically from these
assumptions. The question is, therefore, whether the reasons offered
to justify application of the rule that an inadvertent failure to object
precludes subsequent review, reasons subsumed within the general
claim that finality must attach to criminal judgments, outweigh that
conclusion.
B) The Interests Served By Attaching Finality To Criminal Judgments.
Finality is said to be necessary for several reasons."' First, pro-
cedural rules should encourage trial proceedings to be as free from
court designating that which is to be included in the record for purposes of the ap-
peal. This praecipe must be filed within 30 days after the trial court's ruling on the
motion to correct errors or the right to appeal is forfeited. IND. R. App. P. 2. Given
the short time limits normally associated with direct appeal, it is unlikely that counsel
would have a transcript or other record of the proceedings which could be utilized
to review the events of trial for purposes of identifying claims of error not previously
recognized. To provide any meaningful opportunity for such a review by counsel would
significantly delay the processing of claims.
Moreover, there is a benefit to requiring that claims of error be presented first
to the trial court. The trial court will be the court most familiar with the case. This
does not suggest that claims not presented to the trial court in the original proceedings
should be forfeited. It suggests only that such claims should not be initially asserted
on direct appeal. P.C. 1 provides the mechanism for presenting such claims to the
trial court for the initial review.
The necessity of an expeditious appeal process and the notion that the court
most familiar with the case ought to provide the first level of review suggest that
the contemporaneous objection rule ought to be retained for purposes of direct appeal.
200. The text which follows sets forth the arguments commonly advanced in
support of finality. These arguments are sometimes cast in differing terms. Hopefully,
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error as possible since society has concentrated its resources in the
form of judge, jury and witnesses at the trial."' The contemporaneous
objection rule obviously promotes this end by requiring the timely
presentation of claims or objections to the trial court for resolution.
Error may be avoided by such a timely presentation. However, the
defendant can assist in avoiding error or in the timely correction of
error only if he or his counsel is aware that error is about to be com-
mitted or has been committed. The contemporaneous objection rule
can force a defendant to present his claims, but only those claims
of which he is cognizant. Proponents of the rule contend that since
failing to raise a claim results in its forfeiture, the rule deters the
withholding of claims." 2 The rule no doubt deters intentional conduct.
However, it is less than clear that the rule deters inadvertent
conduct."3
Although it may be possible to make a person more careful and
less prone to inadvertence by punishing inadvertence, the contem-
poraneous objection rule visits the punishment on the wrong person.
Most procedural defaults occur by counsel's omission, not by reason
of any act or omission of the client. 4 It is, after all, the lawyer's func-
tion and professional duty to protect a client's rights."5 Lawyers cer-
tainly know that an inadvertent failure to protect a right jeopardizes
the text captures the essence of all such arguments, but at a minimum the main
arguments in favor of finality are addressed.
201. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). "Any procedural rule which
encourages the result that those proceedings be as free of error as possible is thoroughly
desirable .. " Id.
202. Id.
203. The ability to deter conduct by threatening to impose a sanction if the
actor engages in the proscribed conduct apparently assumes rational and conscious
decision-making by the actor. If the actor is unaware that he or she is engaging in
proscribed conduct, it is difficult to understand how the threat of a sanction can deter
such conduct. One possibility is that some small measure of deterrence is acquired
by the threat of a sanction to the extent that the threat may make a person more
diligent and therefore reduce the occurrence of inadvertent conduct. This premise is
discussed in the text which follows.
204. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The right to counsel
arises from the premise that laymen are not skilled in the science of law and thus
the aid of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. See supra note 24. It follows
that if a defendant's rights are not protected at trial, the fault, if any, normally rests
with counsel. Moreover, it is much more likely that such omissions occur by inadvertence
than by intention since there is little, if anything, to be gained from such conduct
and much to lose. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 104.
205. The ethical rules governing the conduct of Indiana lawyers require a lawyer
to represent a client competently including the safeguarding of the client's interests.
See IND. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1971). See also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1979).
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the potential for a fair result at the trial level. Even if such rights
could be vindicated on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings, the
client will suffer the stigma of conviction and perhaps incarceration
until vindication occurs. If the existence of the professional duty com-
bined with the well recognized likelihood of immediate harm is insuf-
ficient to cause counsel to fully protect the client's rights, it is doubtful
that visiting additional punishment on the accused, by deeming his
claim forfeited, will cause counsel to be more careful in avoiding in-
advertent defaults.0 6
Assume, arguendo, that a deterrence scheme can be devised to
cause lawyers to avoid inadvertent defaults. Two points need be made
about such a scheme. First, if the purpose is to deter, one should be
clear about that which is to be deterred. It is not simply counsel's
inadvertent conduct which is to be deterred. Rather, the scheme should
seek to deter counsel's inadvertent failure to secure a client's right.
Thus, whether a right was violated must be determined and com-
municated to counsel as well as the notion that counsel was inatten-
tive. Finding error after finding inadvertence is much more likely to
deter the inadvertent failure to protect a right than is a simple finding
of inadvertence. Second, a scheme designed to deter lawyers which
does not itself impose a formal sanction on lawyers for such inadver-
tent conduct must be predicated on the assumption that lawyers are
interested in fulfilling the professional obligations owed to clients and
in avoiding professional embarrassment.2 17 If such embarrassment is
the informal sanction relied upon to secure deterrence, that sanction
is invoked by finding that the lawyer was professionally "inadvertent"
in falling to discharge his or her obligation to protect the client's
rights. No purpose is served by heaping additional punishment on the
client in the form of forfeiture of a claim of error. Indeed, since the
206. The theory that the bar will rise to the task of preserving all meritorious
issues if the client is faced with the sanction of forfeiture has been urged for many
years. See, e.g., L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939). "The appellate court
should not be compelled to add to its labors because of the bungling of improperly
trained lawyers .... In civil cases clients are often made to suffer for the ignorance
of their attorneys. In criminal cases this is unthinkable. But the way out is not simply
in review of objections not raised, but in improving the bar so that the objections
will be raised and preserved." Id. at 100. If current criticism of the trial bar is a
fair indicator, the bar has not responded; perhaps too much is expected of it. See Burger,
The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates
Essential to Our System? 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227 (1973). Additionally, note that Orfield's
"unthinkable" scenario (client suffers for ignorance of lawyer) is now the reality. See
supra notes 70-172 and accompanying text.
207. These assumptions seem valid given the existence of a professional duty
to protect the client's interest. See supra note 205.
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forfeited issue is not addressed on the merits, the forfeiture rule costs
the system the ability to advise the lawyer that he or she failed to
prevent error. At present, all that need be communicated is that the
claim of error is unavailable for review for want of a timely objection."1
Another justification offered in support of finality is that the
sanctity of safeguards designed to promote a fair determination of
guilt or innocence is diminished if there is no need to claim the benefit
of those safeguards in a timely manner. Therefore, the argument is
made that a penalty must be assessed for failing to claim the protec-
tion of those safeguards on a timely basis."9 This proposition suggests
that requiring forfeiture of a right because of an antecedent procedural
default actually protects the sanctity of the right. The proposition
is both novel and illogical.
Various courts have indicated that some rights may not be the
subject of any surrender, intentional or inadvertent. 1 Indeed, some
rights appear to be sufficiently important such that their loss requires
reversal even when defense counsel participated in the procedure
resulting in the loss of such rights."' Other rights are deemed so fun-
damental as to merit a presumption against waiver and to require
that any waiver be knowing and intentional.212 Our jurisprudential
history suggests that the more valuable the right the more protec-
tion accorded that right. Such doctrines as the fundamental error rule
are premised on the notion that procedural defaults must be excused
and relief provided if loss of a right so taints the trial as to render
it unfair.213 In short, the significance of a right is enhanced by increas-
ing the protection accorded that right. It follows, then, that the more
valuable the right the less likely it is that the right may be in-
advertently forfeited.
The argument that forfeiture is necessary to the sanctity of
safeguards suggests exactly the opposite. It suggests that the
208. The burden is on the state to raise the waiver issue. Once raised, the
petitioner must carry the burden of demonstrating mitigating circumstances to excuse
the waiver. See supra notes 74 and 148. If a defendant is unable to demonstrate suffi-
cient reason to explain the waiver, the inquiry ends without assessment of the merits
of the underlying claim.
209. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982).
210. See Rubin, supra note 13, at 494.
211. For example, it has long been established that such is the case for waiver
of the Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Schlecknoth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 240 (1973).
212. United States v. Bosch, 505 F2d 78, 82 (5th Cir. 1974).
213. See infra text accompanying notes 233-44.
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significance of rights is enhanced by diminishing the protection ac-
corded such rights. The argument is therefore inconsistent with ac-
cepted premises of our criminal jurisprudence. The sanctity of
safeguards is promoted by acknowledging the value and purpose of
such safeguards in promoting a fair and legitimate result. The conclu-
sion which must follow such an acknowledgment is that loss of those
safeguards impairs the integrity of result. If our process is to seek
a result with integrity, the rights which promote such a result should
be accorded more, not less, protection. To suggest that a safeguard
may be inadvertently forfeited disparages the importance of the
safeguard in promoting a fair and reliable determination of guilt or
innocence.214
Another argument advanced in favor of finality is that the failure
to punish procedural defaults will lead to "sandbagging" by defend-
ants and their counsel."5 Meritorious claims will be withheld and a
gamble taken that an acquittal will result at trial. If the acquittal
does not occur, the meritorious claim will be used to provide a basis
for a new trial. Here again is an argument that presumes intentional
conduct. Indeed, the argument presumes rather offensive conduct
which should be deterred.
However, the remedial brush paints too broadly to the extent
that inadvertent failures to object or to assert a claim are punished
in the same fashion as intentional failures. The overbreadth of the
remedial sanction could only be justified on the basis that a court
would be unable to determine whether the omission which gave rise
to the procedural default was intentional or inadvertent. It is difficult
to understand this position since courts determine such issues on a
daily basis."' Assuming that courts are unable to determine the reason
for procedural defaults, a more limited sanction in the form of placing
the burden on the petitioner to demonstrate that his omission was
214. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 110-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The threatened
creation of a more 'airtight system of forfeitures' . . . would disparage the paramount
importance of constitutional rights in our system of government." Id. The notion that
diminishing the protection accorded a right diminishes the significance of the right
itself seems to follow the maxim that there is no right absent a corresponding remedy.
215. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89. "We think the rule . . . may encourage
'sandbagging' on the part of defense lawyers, who may take their chances on a ver-
dict of not guilty in a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional
claims in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off." Id.
216. The culpability requirement in most criminal actions is based on "intent"
in one form or another. Since findings of intent, or lack thereof, are made frequently
in this context, there is no reason to assume that a court would be unable to deter-
mine whether the waiver of a claim was deliberate or inadvertent.
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not intentional would fulfill the intended function of punishing inten-
tional sandbagging, while permitting review of rights which were the
subject of an inadvertent default."
The next argument often advanced to support the need for
finality is that lack of finality undermines deterrence and
rehabilitation. 18 This argument suggests that at some point the law
must convey to the convicted person that a wrong has been committed
and that he is justly subject to the sanction imposed. 19 The effect
of such a message is to direct the individual's focus toward his own
need for rehabilitation and away from inquiry into the fairness of his
original conviction."' Deterrence is said to be served because finality
promotes the expectation that a criminal law violator will swiftly and
justly be punished.22' Both propositions speak primarily to the effect
generated by the very existence of curative process. The lack of final-
ity results primarily from the right to utilize the various devices of
curative process, not from the doctrines which determine whether
review of any particular issue is granted within that curative process.
It is the availability of federal habeas corpus or state post-conviction
review or both which results in a lack of finality. Unless one is willing
to eliminate all curative process or time limit their availability,' there
217. The major premise of this argument, that a criminal defendant would
withhold a meritorious claim for purposes of asserting the claim collaterally may cer-
tainly be challenged. Assuming the accused would be incarcerated pending disposition
of his withheld claim, it seems unlikely that the accused would "sandbag" given the
pace at which justice proceeds and the present condition of our prisons. According
to Justice Brennan, to think that an attorney would intentionally "sandbag" a claim
"simply offends common sense." Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 104 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissen-
ting). Nevertheless, the "sandbagging" argument is preeminent among those offered
to justify the contemporaneous objection rule. See Langley, 256 Ind. at 206, 267 N.E.2d
at 542.
218. See Bator, supra note 4. "Surely it is essential to the educational and deter-
rent functions of the criminal law that we will be able to say that one violating the
law will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just punishment." Id.
at 452. See also Friendly, supra note 7, at 146. The validity of this argument has been
accepted by some members of the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107 (1982).
219. See Friendly, supra note 7. See also Bator, supra note 4.
220. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
"At some point the law must convey to those in custody that a wrong has been com-
mitted, that consequent punishment has been imposed, that one should no longer look
back with the view to resurrecting every imaginable basis for further litigation but
rather should look forward to rehabilitation and to becoming a constructive citizen." Id.
221. Bator, supra note 4, at 452.
222. In the past, Indiana has set arbitrary time limits for post-conviction
remedies. Indiana courts have rejected such limits. See, e.g., State v. Blackford Circuit
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will never be complete finality in criminal cases. It is inevitable that
both those who are suffering wrongful incarceration and those whose
incarceration is just will seek to use available process.2
It is nevertheless accurate to suggest that the waiver doctrine
used to determine whether particular claims are subject to review
may have an impact on rehabilitation and on a prisoner's perception
of the justness of the punishment imposed. However, the thrust of
this rehabilitation argument is opposite to that imagined by advocates
of finality. A perception of justness and fairness on the part of the
prisoner as well as society is best promoted by reviewing the claim
of error on the merits and, if error occurred, by determining its impact
on the integrity of the adjudication. This perception is diminished when
a convicted person is advised that review of his claim is foreclosed
by an inadvertent procedural default. By refusing to review claims
on the merits, courts permit, if not encourage, a prisoner to rationalize
his conduct by blaming his counsel or the system for his
incarceration.224
If the claim of error is addressed on the merits, one of three
possibilities would result. If no error is found, the prisoner is advised
Court, 229 Ind. 3, 95 N.E.2d 556 (1950), wherein the court allowed a lower court to
consider a defendant's entitlement to a writ of coram nobis despite a statutory pro-
scription preventing such consideration after the lapse of five years from judgment.
The court ruled that "where he (a petitioner) makes a good case, the writ should be
granted." Id. at 16, 95 N.E.2d at 561. The court suggested that an arbitrary time limit
might deprive a defendant of the right to relief in situations in which the defendant
did not learn that his rights were violated until after the passage of the statutory
period. The court determined that the better rule would be to require due diligence
in the assertion of rights after the defendant acquires sufficient knowledge of his rights.
Id.
223. Because this is true, it seems apparent that one of the tasks to be accom-
plished by any system of collateral review is to prevent abuse of that process, whether
the form of abuse be repetitious filings, meritless filings or attempts to assert claims
previously voluntarily surrendered. This problem should be susceptible to a narrower
solution than the current Indiana formula. This current formula attempts to eliminate
such abuse by use of a forfeiture rule which not only prevents abuse but strips the
good faith litigant of meritorious claims. See supra notes 70-153 and accompanying text.
224. The clearest example of this is the rule permitting review on the merits
of an otherwise forfeited claim on a finding that counsel was ineffective. See supra
notes 157-59 and accompanying text. As a consequence, prisoners frequently contend
that counsel was ineffective as a means of securing review. See Kimble v. State,
Ind. -, _, 451 N.E.2d 302, 307 (1983). One of the better examples of what should
not be communicated to a prisoner occurred in Wilkins v. State, - Ind. App. ,
426 N.E.2d 61 (1981). Wilkins was effectively advised that an error occurred, and that
a reversal would have been required had the error been preserved and asserted on
direct appeal. However, the inadvertence of counsel forfeited the claim. Wilkins, __
Ind. App. at - 426 N.E.2d at 63.
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that his conviction is just. If error is found and is of sufficient
magnitude to require reversal, the prisoner will receive that to which
he is entitled-relief from a wrongful conviction. If error is found but
is deemed not to have had sufficient impact to justify the conclusion
that the conviction was wrongful, the prisoner is clearly advised that
his incarceration is not a consequence of legal error, but of his guilt
justly determined.
One of the most significant arguments in favor of expeditiously
attaching finality to criminal judgments is that allowing delayed col-
lateral attack may cost society the right to punish admitted
offenders.1 The "admitted offenders" language is a reference to guilty
plea cases. This cost arises as a consequence of the practical inability
of the State to retry a defendant after a lapse of time between the
event giving rise to criminal charges and the grant of collateral relief.
Such a delay no doubt renders some evidence unavailable either by
demise of witnesses, witnesses' loss of recollection or a failure to
preserve physical evidence. Since the State carries the burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, loss of evidence is usually
more adverse to the State than to the accused.
Several points must be made with regard to this particular argu-
ment. The argument made here is that an inadvertent default should
not foreclose subsequent review on the merits of a claim of error.
Let us assume that at some point during the course of criminal pro-
ceedings an error is made and that, by reason of inadvertence, no
timely objection is lodged. If the case thereafter concludes with a
guilty plea, the antecedent error should be deemed waived not by
reason of the procedural default, but by the entry of a valid guilty
plea.' Such a waiver should occur because a valid guilty plea con-
stitutes an admission of factual guilt. 7 An antecedent violation of a
225. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982).
226. See Toilet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). "[A] guilty plea represents
a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process." Id.
227. Note that the United States Constitution does not require that a defen-
dant admit factual guilt as a prerequisite to a court accepting a guilty plea. North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). However, the Alford decision turns, in large
part, on the finding that a strong factual basis existed. "In view of the strong factual
basis for the plea demonstrated by the State and Alford's clearly expressed desire
to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence, we hold that the trial judge
did not commit constitutional error in accepting it." Id. at 38.
Moreover, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that Indiana courts may not
accept a guilty plea from a defendant who maintains his innocence. Ross v. State,
- Ind. _ 456 N.E.2d 420 (1983). In Indiana, a guilty plea necessarily constitutes
an admission of factual guilt.
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right undermines the integrity of the proceedings because rights are
designed to provide a fair and legitimate determination of factual guilt
or innocence. The antecedent error may be said to have been rendered
moot or waived since the accused admits factual guilt by the entry
of a valid guilty plea. After a valid admission of factual guilt there
is simply no need to determine whether rights designed to promote
a reliable adjudication were given proper adherence because a fac-
tually reliable determination has been obtained. 8 Accordingly, guilty
plea cases can be excluded from consideration with regard to the argu-
ment asserted here since those cases by their nature provide an in-
dependent basis on which review may be foreclosed separate and
distinct from the question whether an inadvertent default should
foreclose such review.
To be responsive to this article's premise that inadvertence
should not preclude review, the societal cost argument must be recast
in the following form. To permit collateral attack on claims which were
the subject of an inadvertent procedural default may cost society the
right to punish one who may or may not be guilty because the state's
capacity to retry a defendant may be diminished or eliminated by
the passage of time. In response to this argument, first note that the
risk that the State will be unable to retry the accused is substantially
diminished when guilty plea cases are excluded from consideration.
In cases not resolved by a guilty plea, that risk is limited by
additional considerations. In cases resolved by bench or jury trial,
there exists a record including a transcript of testimony or the ability
to produce such a transcript and, presumably, the physical evidence
used at the trial. Since the prior testimony was taken under oath and
subject to cross examination, it should be admissible in any subse-
quent retrial.' The problem of lost witnesses or failing recollections
is therefore simply overstated in the context of cases which were ac-
tually tried. The real cost results from the use of dry transcripts which
may not be as persuasive as live testimony. Such a cost is not as
significant as that suggested by the oversimplified claim that retrial
may be impossible. Nor is the actual cost insurmountable. The same
could be dealt with by requiring proper maintenance of records.
228. An exception to the doctrine that a guilty plea waives antecedent claims
is the claim that the court which accepted the guilty plea lacked jurisdiction to do
so. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974). In Perry, a case decided on double
jeopardy grounds, the Court accepted the proposition that the right not to be haled
into court at all is one which will not merge with a guilty plea. Id.
229. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the various interests
served by finality must be examined in the context of the particular
type of collateral attack under consideration in order to determine
whether those interests are served or undermined by precluding
review.2' The discussion also demonstrates that the interests served
by expeditiously attaching finality to criminal judgments are not as
significantly undermined by permitting review of issues inadvertently
waived as is commonly assumed by advocates of finality. 231 Never-
theless, those interests, to the extent they remain viable, should be
accommodated with the interest served by curative process. The pro-
per accommodation requires a balancing of these interests and clearly
involves a value judgment. 2 A more informed judgment can be made
after examining the doctrines of accommodation presently utilized in
Indiana.
C) Current Doctrines of Accommodation.
1) The Fundamental Error Rule.
To a limited degree, present day doctrines recognize that the
contemporaneous objection rule must bend in favor of full litigation
in criminal cases. The fundamental error rule is a prime example. Its
230. For example, assessing the impairment of finality wrought by relitigation
of claims would involve considerations much different than does the question addressed
herein. Permitting relitigation suggests a complete lack of finality. On the other hand,
permitting litigation of claims not previously raised by reason of inadvertence means
that finality should attach to claims only after the courts have addressed the same
or such claims have been voluntarily abandoned. The difference in the degree of
diminishment of finality is obvious. See also infra note 231.
231. As suggested in Langley, one ought not be able to intentionally withhold
claims for purposes of gaining a tactical advantage. 256 Ind. at 206, 267 N.E.2d at
542. Expeditiously attaching finality to judgments prevents such abuse. However, the
prevention of abuse argument is devoid of weight in the context of inadvertent defaults.
Moreover, principles of fairness suggest the need to distinguish between deliberate
and inadvertent defaults in determining the appropriate sanction. Fairness is an ap-
propriate inquiry since the purpose of the entire process is to provide a fair result.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 565 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
232. The balancing problem is discussed in Hews v. Evans, 99 Wash. 2d 80,
660 P.2d 263 (1983). In Hews the court rejected its prior holdings that issues which
were known or could have been known but were not raised at trial or on appeal,
may not be raised in a collateral attack proceeding. The court found that such a rule
was "too blunt an instrument for the delicate operation of determining claims which
should be given collateral review." Hews, 99 Wash.2d at -, 660 P.2d at 266 (quoting
In re Hagler, 97 Wash. 2d 818, 650 P.2d 1103 (1982)). The Washington court replaced
its prior rule with the principle that relief should be granted on a showing of actual
prejudice. Hews quite clearly represents the conclusion that the forfeiture rule too
frequently sacrifices curative process to the desire for finality.
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existence adds support to the proposition that procedural defaults
should not and do not inevitably preclude review of claims on the
merits.233 The fundamental error rule permits, and perhaps requires,
a reviewing court to address errors not properly preserved if the error
so taints a trial as to render it unfair and biased.234 To permit review
and relief, the error must be significantly more egregious than that
which would merit reversal on direct appeal.3 5
The purpose of the rule was described in Wilson v. State38
wherein defendant's counsel, among other omissions, failed to object
to the trial judge's comments that the defendant was perjuring himself
or about to perjure himself.23 ' On direct appeal, the State argued that
the trial judge's conduct in making these remarks was not properly
preserved for review for want of a timely trial objection. The court
responded as follows:
With such a record before us, what is our duty? The easy
course would have been to examine the motion for new trial
and, having found that the errors relied upon are not men-
tioned therein, to have affirmed the judgment. For such a
decision there are many precedents. But in a case involving
an appellant's life or liberty we may not ignore prejudicial
errors affecting his constitutional rights when, as here, they
are clearly and adequately presented in appellant's brief
with supporting bill of exceptions. The procedural rules that
would prevent their consideration must give way to the fun-
damental principles of due process. For this course also
there are precedents.3 8
233. The fundamental error rule does not excuse all procedural defaults. See
infra text accompanying notes 23445. However, its existence demonstrates the necessity
of balancing between finality and fairness and that procedural rules must sometimes
bend in the interest of fairness.
234. See, e.g., Lacy v. State, __ Ind. - 438 N.E.2d 968 (1982); Franklin
v. State, 266 Ind. 540, 364 N.E.2d 1019 (1977); Winston v. State, 165 Ind. App. 369,
332 N.E.2d 229 (1975).
235. To secure a reversal on direct appeal, a defendant must show error and
prejudice resulting therefrom. Brown v. State, __ Ind. __, 448 N.E.2d 10 (1983);
Smith v. State, __, Ind. __, 432 N.E2d 1363 (1982). The denial of a constitutional
right raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. Harris v. State, 249 Ind. 681, 231
N.E.2d 800 (1967). On the other hand, the fundamental error rule requires a showing
of error that "pervades the climate of the proceedings below, viewed as a whole,
depriving the defendant of any realistic opportunity for a fair hearing." Winston v.
State, 165 Ind. App. 369, 375, 332 N.E.2d 229, 232 (1975).
236. Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1943).
237. Id. at 66-7, 51 N.E.2d at 850.
238. Id. at 78, 51 N.E.2d at 854.
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The basic premise of the fundamental error rule is that one ought
not be deprived of his liberty because of the carelessness of defense
counsel and of the trial court in failing to prevent error which of-
fends basic notions of fairness.239 In Indiana, the doctrine has been
described by various formulations. The consistent theme of such for-
mulations is that the error must be egregious. Indiana cases suggest
that the error must be blatant,2" or deny fundamental due process,24'
or offend concepts of criminal justice.242 Moreover, the potential for
harm arising from the error must be substantial.24
The conclusion to be drawn from fundamental error cases is quite
clear and rather simple. When the interest at stake is liberty, pro-
cedural defaults do not and should not inevitably prevent correction
of significant errors which affect the integrity of the process.2" The
fundamental error analysis assumes that failure to properly preserve
an issue precludes review of that issue absent a determination that
failure to accord the right at issue rendered the original procedure
repugnant to our concepts of basic fairness.2" Both the right to review
of the error and the right to relief from the error are simultaneously
determined and turn on the nature of the underlying error and its
probable impact.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157 (1936). "In exceptional
circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may,
of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken . . . if they
otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial pro-
ceedings." Id. at 160. See also Young v. State, 249 Ind. 286, 231 N.E.2d 797 (1967).
"[O]ne is not to be deprived of his liberty because of carelessness on the part of the
trial judge and of defense counsel in failing to call to the attention of this Court a
gross error which offends our concept of criminal justice." Id. at 289, 231 N.E.2d at 799.
240. Nelson v. State, - Ind. - 409 N.E.2d 637-38 (1980).
241. Young v. State, 249 Ind. 286, 231 N.E.2d 797 (1967).
242. Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1943).
243. Nelson, - Ind. at __, 409 N.E.2d at 638. The federal equivalent, the
"plain error rule" is found in FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), and states that "[pplain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought
to the attention of the court." Id. To be a plain error, it must be both "obvious and
substantial." United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 920 (1981). The plain error rule, however, is not applicable in collateral attacks
on a criminal judgment brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255. United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152 (1982). "[T]he lower court's use of the 'plain error' standard to review
Frady's S 2255 motion ... was contrary to the . . . principle that to obtain collateral
relief a prisoner must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct
appeal." Id. at 166.
244. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Bosch,
505 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1974).
245. See supra note 221.
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The fundamental error rule's major failing is that it recognizes
a right of review which courts of review in most instances are in-
capable of according. The rule recognizes an obligation on, or at least
empowers, such courts to correct errors offensive to our concepts of
justice despite antecedent procedural defaults.24 But curative process,
be it direct appeal or post-conviction review, has never entailed an
all encompassing review. The litigants or their counsel determine the
issues to be presented and which portions of the "trial" record are
necessary for the review of those designated issues. Courts of review
deal with less than the total record and, with regard to the partial
record before such courts, do not and could not engage in any review
designed to discover error.247 Courts rely on the litigants or their
representatives to direct the court's attention to particular claims of
error. Yet the fundamental error rule recognizes that significant error
can occur and be undiscovered by the litigants, their representatives
or the court and simultaneously permits or requires that such error
be corrected.
The recognition that litigants may fail to identify errors which
significantly undermine the integrity of the process coupled with the
notion that appellate courts are empowered if not obligated to cor-
rect such errors notwithstanding the litigant's default suggest that
curative process outside normal channels must be available for pur-
poses of addressing such claims. Post-conviction proceedings serve such
a function. Moreover, unless our society is willing to countenance the
denial of fundamental due process, this analysis suggests that the
scope of review in post-conviction proceedings be at least sufficiently
broad to permit the assertion of claims cognizable under the fundamen-
tal error doctrine despite an antecedent procedural default.
There is yet another aspect of the fundamental error rule which
is relevant to the question whether an inadvertent procedural default
should preclude review of claims in post-conviction proceedings. The
fundamental error rule recognizes that an inadvertent procedural
default does not waive one's right to relief from error which offends
society's concepts of criminal justice248 or denies fundamental due
246. Several cases suggest that a court of review may not ignore such error.
See Wilson, 222 Ind. at 78, 51 N.E.2d at 854; Young, 249 Ind. at 289, 231 N.E.2d at
799. Subsequent cases suggest that review is permissive, not mandatory. See, e.g.,
Rowley v. State, __ Ind . . , 442 N.E.2d 343, 345 (1982).
247. It is not suggested that courts of review conduct such inquiries. The diver-
sion of resources required to accomplish such a task probably would diminish the quality
of justice received by all litigants.
248. See supra note 239.
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process."' The Indiana Supreme Court has defined the relationship
between the fundamental error rule and the waiver doctrine as follows:
Where an alleged error does not rise to the level of fun-
damental error, it is waived absent a contemporaneous
objection. 210
Each time a court determines that an issue has been waived by
procedural default and is therefore not available for review, the court
is deciding, consciously or unconsciously, that the claim of error was
not fundamental error. Although one may argue that Indiana appellate
courts are cognizant of the implicit determination underlying a finding
of waiver, the decisions do not suggest that this is the case. Unless
a question of fundamental error is raised by a litigant, the Indiana
courts will reach a waiver conclusion without addressing the claim
of error on the merits.
Such a procedure is inconsistent with the logic of the fundamental
error doctrine. One cannot determine whether an error is fundamental
error unless and until it is determined that there was error. There
is no authoritative list for determining whether an error is funda-
mental error. Fundamental error is a matter of circumstances requiring
an inquiry into circumstances.25' Thus, the assumption underlying the
fundamental error rule, i.e., that an inadvertent procedural default
does not divest a litigant of the right to relief from significant error,
requires an appraisal of the merits of the claimed error to determine
its nature and impact. Furthermore, to conclude that a litigant must
denominate his claim as involving fundamental error to trigger a right
to review on the merits would be inconsistent with the basic premise
of the rule. A timely objection to such error is not a predicate to
vindication because correction of such error is intended to vindicate
the integrity of the adjudicatory process.25 If this rationale requires
such error to be addressed despite a procedural default, no burden
should be placed on a petitioner to claim the benefit of the rule.
At present, a post-conviction petitioner can obtain review on the
merits of his claim by denominating the claim as fundamental error.
While the Indiana Supreme Court has stated its displeasure with such
249. See supra note 238.
250. Lacy v. State, __ Ind. 438 N.E.2d 968, 970 (1982).
251. See Crosson v. State, Ind. , 410 N.E.2d 1194 (1980) (error considered
in context of entire trial); Roberts v. State, n__ d. App. -, 419 N.E.2d 803 (1981)
(character of error evaluated in light of its effect on trial as a whole).
252. Good v. State, 267 Ind. 29, 366 N.E.2d 1169 (1977).
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conduct, ' the same seems clearly designed to circumvent the other-
wise automatic invocation of the contemporaneous objection rule which
would preclude review. Denominating a claim as fundamental error
forces the court to do what it should be doing in the first instance -
addressing the merits to determine whether the nature and impact
of the claimed error are sufficiently egregious to excuse the procedural
default and require the grant of relief.
The foremost reason for favoring such an approach is institu-
tional integrity. If the purpose of the entire process is to provide a
fair and legitimate determination of guilt or innocence, permitting
devices of curative process to fulfill that function gives validity to
the result. This is only true, however, if the justness of the result
is examined on the merits.
Moreover, when a court of review addresses a claim on the merits
it promotes the application of uniform standards by lower courts. This
result occurs for two reasons. First, a decision on the merits defines
the controlling substantive or procedural law. The act of defining the
law provides the guidance which courts of review are supposed to
provide and promotes uniformity by advising trial courts of the nature
of the rules. Second, the availability of review promotes the actual
application of such rules by trial courts in that relief is assured if
a deviation occurs."5 Thus, review on the merits by appellate courts
promotes uniformity and, more importantly, promotes the actual ap-
plication of rules designed to provide a fair and reliable result; it
therefore reinforces the system's goal of reaching a fair and legitimate
result.
5
While it is suggested that the premises supporting the fundamen-
tal error rule require review on the merits of all claims of error, it
is not suggested that relief be limited to those cases meeting the fun-
damental error standard of reversal. The doctrine assumes the validity
of the underlying proposition that forfeiture is necessary to protect
the interest served by attaching finality to judgments but would find
that those interests must yield to the need for curative process in
cases of gross error.5 ' The focus of the rule is misdirected.
It is submitted that while the question whether relief should be
253. Kimble v. State, - Ind. -, , 451 N.E.2d 302, 307 (1983).
254. L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 33-4 (1939).
255. Id. at 33.
256. The validity of the first proposition regarding the necessity of forfeiture
is certainly debatable. See supra notes 200-29 and accompanying text.
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granted properly turns on the nature of the error, the question of
entitlement to review should normally turn on conduct.2 57 An error
which affects or otherwise significantly impairs the judgment is the
same error whether or not properly preserved and regardless of
whether it is asserted on direct appeal or collateral attack. Moreover,
the purpose of the entire process, including curative process, is to
provide a reliable and legitimate determination of guilt or innocence.
Either the presence of error sufficiently impairs the integrity of the
result so as to require a new determination be made or it does not.
If a determination of guilt would be deemed sufficiently unreliable
to require relief on direct appeal it must be deemed unreliable when
tested in any other proceeding. The nature of the error does not
change. If relief is to be denied it must be denied because the peti-
tioner is not entitled to review of the claimed error.
The refusal to review is obviously a sanction. Such sanctions exist
today in the form of forfeitures imposed pursuant to the contem-
poraneous objection rule. It is not suggested that sanctions are never
appropriate. Rather, the present point is that if a sanction is imposed
it is clearly predicated on conduct. At present, the conduct which
results in forfeiture under the contemporaneous objection rule is the
257. It is not suggested that all rights are susceptible to surrender by the
conduct of an individual defendant. See generally Rubin, supra note 13, at 493-94. Ex-
amples might include the restraint on government which prohibits incarceration of
citizens in penal facilities absent conviction for a crime, and the restraint which pro-
hibits conviction for non-existent crimes. Correction of such error is not intended for
the benefit of the accused but rather to preserve the integrity of the adjudicatory
process. Thus, even if the defendant does not desire correction of such error, correc-
tion must occur. Moon v. State, 267 Ind. 27, 29, 366 N.E.2d 1168-69 (1977) (defendant
pled guilty to non-existent offense). Obviously, the occurrence of error of this magnitude
is very rare. Indiana courts apparently recognize two types of fundamental error. The
first type is of the nature identified in Moon and constitutes a separate type since
the same apparently is not subject to waiver. The second type is error which meets
the test of having denied the defendant due process but which is subject to express
waiver. Rowley v. State, - Ind. -, ., 442 N.E.2d 343, 345 (1982) (defendant
waived reading of the final instructions to the jury). In Rowley, the court held that
a litigant could waive his right to a reading of the final instructions for tactical reasons.
The waiver must be express. Id. Prior to Rowley, the Indiana Supreme Court had
held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury constituted fundamental error.
Drake v. State, 271 Ind. 400-01, 393 N.E.2d 148 (1979). Apparently, violation of the
right to have final instructions read was not deemed to significantly undermine the
integrity of the process. No other basis would appear to justify the inconsistency be-
tween Moon and Rowley regarding waiver of fundamental error.
The suggestion here is simply that the first level of inquiry to determine whether
a litigant is entitled to post-conviction review after a procedural default is that involving
the litigant's conduct. Was the default intentional or inadvertent?
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failure to object regardless of whether the omission is deliberate or
inadvertent.
It is submitted that one ought not lose a right intended to pro-
mote a reliable determination unless as a product of conscious decision-
making. In matters involving liberty, one should not suffer the loss
of rights designed to provide a fair and reliable result absent a volun-
tary surrender of those rights. Further, many of the interests served
by finality relate to conduct, such as deterring intentional sandbagging
or fostering good lawyering. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest
that any doctrine of accommodation ought to focus first on conduct
rather than the nature or impact of claimed error in determining
whether there is an entitlement to review.25
Moreover, the fundamental error rule's use of a different stan-
dard of reversal-requiring error more egregious than that required
on direct appeal- undermines the integrity of the system. A judg-
ment is either legitimate and reliable or illegitimate and unreliable.
A determination of guilt does not become more reliable or acquire
legitimacy by reason of being tested by a more rigorous standard for
reversal. Rather than focus on the quality of the error, the inquiry
to determine the right to review should first relate to the conduct
of the petitioner.
Any system which ties the entitlement to review solely to the
nature of the error should be rejected for failure to address the central
question-is the litigant entitled to the protection of a right or has
he by his conduct, actual or imputed, given up that right? As a corol-
lary, all systems of curative process should determine the reliability
of the judgment under review by a singular standard if for no other
reason than to maintain the integrity of the system. Entitlement to
review and the right to relief are distinct concepts which should be
treated separately.
2) The Mitigating Circumstances Rule.
The perception that only the presence of egregious error will
excuse an antecedent procedural default is also reflected in the second
258. The courts seem preoccupied by the prospect of a litigant intentionally
"sandbagging." See Wainwright, 432 U.S. at 89; Langley, 256 Ind. at 206, 267 N.E.2d
at 542. Certainly such conduct should be penalized. But if the primary concern is the
prevention of such intentional conduct, the remedial device used to sanction such con-
duct should be more discriminatory in application than is the forfeiture rule, i.e., in-
advertent conduct should not be punished in the same fashion as is intentional con-
duct. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
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doctrine of accommodation of relevance here -the "mitigating circum-
stances" rule. This rule has been construed in Indiana case law as
requiring a post-conviction petitioner to demonstrate a violation of
his right to effective assistance of counsel before being excused from
the application of the contemporaneous objection rule. 59 Under the
mitigating circumstances rule, much like the fundamental error rule,
the right to review of the claimed error and the right to relief from
the error is simultaneously determined. The precise nature of the rule
and its general deficiencies have already been explored. ° It is suffi-
cient to note that the mitigating circumstances rule "excuses" the prior
procedural default only if a petitioner demonstrates the existence of
an independent ground for relief-violation of the right to counsel.
Once such a violation is proven, the underlying claim of error is
superfluous. This reality suggests that the rule imposes far too high
a burden of justification on the petitioner.
Whether the limitations to review and relief imposed by the fun-
damental error rule and the mitigating circumstances rule are justified
is simply a restatement of the original question posed in this article.
That is, what accommodation is required to protect the State's interests
in finality and yet fulfill the function of curative process in the con-
text of claims which were the subject of an inadvertent procedural
default? The thesis asserted here is that an inadvertent default should
not bar review of a claim on the merits in post-conviction proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Review of claims in post-conviction proceedings should be denied
by reason of an antecedent procedural default only if the default was
knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The language of P.C. 1 requires
such a finding before a litigant is deprived of the opportunity to assert
a claim which was not properly preserved. However, one need not
rely on the rule to support this conclusion. The costs associated with
permitting such review are significantly outweighed by the benefits
derived.
The nature of the interests served by attaching finality to criminal
judgments has often been ill defined. '61 Finality arguments tend to
be stated in terms so broad that such arguments are of little use.
A meaningful assessment of those interests can occur only in the con-
text of the particular type of collateral attack being permitted.262 The
259. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 199-225 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 199-225 and accompanying text.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1984], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss2/1
INADVERTENT PROCEDURAL DEFAULTS
cost or impairment of those interests which results by permitting the
assertion of claims which were subject to an inadvertent procedural
default are real but do not appear overwhelming or insurmountable.263
On the other hand, the benefits of permitting such review are
substantial.
Review of such claims compels curative process to accomplish
its intended function-to ascertain whether the result constitutes a
fair and legitimate determination of guilt. If we assume the necessity
of curative process as inherent in our shared values of fairness in
process and result, fulfilling that function is in itself a significant
benefit. The chief function of curative process is to see that justice
has been done.26' One cannot make such a determination without ad-
dressing the merits. Moreover, addressing issues on the merits forces
an appellate court to accept and discharge its leadership role in
defining the standards by which we determine whether a fair and
reliable result has been obtained.
The costs associated with refusing such review are substantial.
Precluding review because of inadvertence, usually counsel's in-
advertence, unduly punishes a defendant and robs the system of the
ability to determine whether the result reached is fair and legitimate.
Such cost could be avoided, the state's interests in finality served, and
meaningful curative process be made available by use of a less drastic
alternative.
The proposal suggested here is to place the burden of
demonstrating that the antecedent procedural default was not a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver on the post-conviction
petitioner."5 Obviously such a waiver would not arise by inadvertent
omissions. This rule would prevent abuse of process or sandbagging
263. See supra notes 199-225 and accompanying text.
264. L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 32-4 (1939).
265. This is the approach resembling, at some level, that suggested in ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 6, at S 22-6.1(c)(ii). "Where a rule or procedure.., requires that
specified defenses or objections be presented at a certain time, and an applicant raises
in a post-conviction proceeding an issue that might have been but was not presented
in a timely manner ... the applicant should be required to show cause for the failure
to comply with the rule of procedure." Id. A showing of "cause" for a procedural default
and prejudice resulting therefrom is also required of state prisoners seeking federal
habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
Such a showing is also required of federal prisoners on collateral attack pursuant to
28 U.S.C. S 2255. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). Some courts have
held or suggested that inadvertence of counsel constitutes cause. See, e.g., Rachel v.
Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 204 (6th Cir. 1978); Tyler v. Phelps, 662 F.2d 172, 178
n.10 (5th Cir. 1980). But see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982).
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and yet permit relief for the defendant who has not engaged in such
conduct. An incentive would still exist for counsel and client to avoid
error at the first opportunity. That incentive is the avoidance of a
wrongful conviction and the incarceration which follows until relief
is accorded.
By addressing claims of error on the merits, the court of review
would serve the state's interest in rehabilitation. The message com-
municated to a prisoner would cease to be that the justness of the
incarceration is not subject to review because of an inadvertent
default. Rather, the message is either the conviction was just or it
was unjust.
Moreover, such a course would recognize the sanctity of the
safeguards which attach to criminal trials by recognizing that the loss
of such safeguards diminishes the integrity of the result and therefore
requires scrutiny of that result. These benefits come at no cost to
judicial efficiency because the doctrine primarily employed at present,
the mitigating circumstances rule, effectively requires examination of
counsel's total trial conduct. If a court utilized the proposal suggested
herein, the scope of the inquiry would actually be narrowed to one
segment of the trial-the claim of error asserted and whether counsel's
conduct in failing to assert the claim was deliberate.
The Indiana Supreme Court was correct when it recognized that
justice and fairness require that a defendant be provided with an op-
portunity to test the correctness of his conviction in post-conviction
proceedings.' The time has come for fulfillment of the promise implicit
in that recognition.
266. Langley v. State, 256 Ind. 199, 203, 267 N.E.2d 538, 540 (1971).
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